

**Armed Groups:
A Tier-One Security Priority**

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this fifty-seventh volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Richard Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara Lochard offered this paper for INSS publication because they saw it as complementary with two previous papers that we have published: Troy Thomas and Stephen Kiser's *Lords of the Silk Route* (Occasional Paper #43, May 2002); and Troy Thomas and William Casebeer's *Violent Systems* (Occasional Paper #52, March 2004). We agree. The Thomas, Kiser, Casebeer papers establish a systematic framework for the analysis of the broad category of violent non-state actors. Shultz, Farah, and Lochard add detail to significant elements of that framework. They develop a four-category typology of armed groups, demonstrating that one must recognize and adapt to the differences among the different types of violent actors in today's international environment. They also develop a very promising profiling model for these groups, creating effectively a four-by-six matrix for group analysis. And they also suggest significant geographic regions of danger where these groups can thrive without effective controls. Finally, they suggest how the intelligence and operational communities must adapt to effectively counter this rising and significant threat. We commend this work as further development of important knowledge about this key arena of emerging national security threat.

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JAMES M. SMITH
Director

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Non-state armed groups pose a major security challenge to the United States, even without their acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

Armed groups have now developed global capabilities to strike at high-value political, economic, population, and symbolic targets as well as level strategic blows. They seek not only local but also regional and global influence. Al Qaeda demonstrated this capacity on 9/11. It forced the United States to radically change its antiterrorism policy.

Other armed groups seek to have the same strategic impact by using the more standard forms of *direct* violence employed by terrorists and insurgents. Armed groups in Iraq are a case in point. Their attacks, which rapidly and violently spiraled over the last year, hope to put an end to the US reconstruction and democratization of Iraq. If successful, this would be a strategic defeat for the United States, with all the long-term ramifications that would entail.

There are also *indirect* ways armed groups attempt to undermine US policy. They do so by destabilizing states and/or regions that are of critical importance. For example, in Afghanistan, clan militias, as well as regrouping Taliban and al Qaeda forces, are committed to a long, drawn-out, and protracted conflict. They seek to prevent major political reforms, a central US policy goal in the war on terrorism.

In other states and regions, collaboration between political actors and criminal armed groups undercut stability, the rule of law, and political and economic development. The Andean Ridge region is illustrative. Large parts of it — both within and/or across state borders — have been turned into lawless and ungoverned territory in which narco-traffickers, insurgents, and other criminal gangs thrive.

There is little to suggest that these *direct* and *indirect* challenges posed by armed groups — insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations — are a temporary phenomenon. Rather, all data trends illustrate just the opposite.

First, the number of weak and failed states remains a significant and chronic problem. In these regions, armed groups

find a hospitable environment with relative freedom from government authority and control.

Second, topographical mapping of these lawless and ungoverned areas reveals they cover a massive amount of territory, providing armed groups with access to secure bases for training, planning, and launching operations locally, regionally, and globally.

Third, non-state armed groups and internal/transnational conflicts pose the most recurrent cause of instability around the globe. And they are growing more lethal due to their acquisition and indiscriminate use of highly destructive weapons. Moreover, many of these conflicts, particularly those due to ethnic, religious, tribal, and communal differences, will remain vicious, long-lasting, and difficult to terminate.

Fourth, the gravity of this situation is further compounded by the publicly stated objective of several armed groups to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.

Armed groups will not only continue to pose serious and dangerous strategic challenges into the 21st century, but also provide strategic opportunities that can be exploited to help achieve policy goals. There have and will be instances where the United States may find collaborating with armed group is in its strategic interests.

The Northern Alliance in Afghanistan is an example. In the latter 1990s, it sought US help in fighting the Taliban, who were then closely aligned with al Qaeda. A serious program of assistance as part of an overall strategy to degrade al Qaeda would have put it on the defensive. Having to worry about its own security would have meant less time to plan and execute operations against American targets. But no such aid was forthcoming because Washington did not grasp the opportunity.

To manage, neutralize, or utilize the phenomenon of armed groups an appreciable understanding of these actors — as well as the threats and opportunities that flow from them — is needed. Even today, doubts remain in the US defense and intelligence communities over whether any armed group can carry out attacks that could have a strategic impact or if armed groups can provide a strategic opportunity.

Understanding armed groups requires sophisticated tools for differentiating between and among them, as well as for constructing and monitoring systematic profiles of how they organize and function. Such profiles can serve to guide the ways in which states' intelligence and security services plan and conduct operations against or in support of them.

What are these key operational characteristics? It will not be easy to find this [information](#). Some is available, but much is hidden. The characteristics can be divided into six categories:

1. An understanding of the different leaders of the group, their roles, styles, personalities, abilities, beliefs, rivalries, and insecurities.
2. The group's membership, how they are recruited, trained, and retained, as well as whether they are cohesive or riddled with factional divisions.
3. The group's organizational infrastructure — funding sources, communications, logistical control, propaganda and media resources, security, and intelligence capabilities.
4. Different ideological, political, and cultural codes, beliefs, and cleavages.
5. Operational doctrine, strategy, and tactics.
6. The extent of linkages with other actors.

Such profiles serve as the basis for developing intelligence and special operations options — political, psychological, economic, and paramilitary — for responding to and degrading armed groups. They can likewise be used to determine whether and how to assist other armed groups that can help facilitate American foreign policy objectives.

Faced with a 21st century international security landscape in which armed groups will present a plethora of *direct* tier-one and *indirect* threats and opportunities, the United States should take the following steps to meet these challenges:

- Policymakers and intelligence community managers must comprehend both the complex nature of the

armed groups as well as the threats and opportunities that flow from their emergence.

- Beyond constituting threats, in certain cases armed groups may also provide opportunities that, if seized, will contribute to the attainment of US foreign policy objectives.
- Major changes are needed in a US intelligence community where doubts remain over whether an armed group can undermine major American interests through attacks that have a strategic impact. That such attacks constitute a form of warfare also remains a suspect proposition.
- The organizational cultures of the intelligence agencies tasked with analytic and operational responsibilities of dealing with armed groups require major revision. New cultures must be established that approach armed groups as a tier-one priority.
- Sophisticated tools must be developed for differentiating among armed groups, as well as for constructing profiles of how they organize and function. These tools should serve as the basis for all source collection that provides the information needed for such profiles.
- These profiles would serve as the basis for developing intelligence and special operations options — political, psychological, economic, and paramilitary — for responding to and degrading those armed groups that threaten the United States.
- These profiles should also be adapted for use not only against armed groups already directly or indirectly attacking the United States, but also to identify those in nascent stages.
- Armed group profiles can likewise be employed to identify ways in which the United States may assist certain armed groups whose success will be advantageous to US foreign policy objectives.

- Finally, beyond major revisions in the culture of the intelligence community there is the need to establish new practical requirements to create the requisite intelligence doctrine, organization, training, and personnel to meet the armed groups challenge in the 21st century.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This monograph was prepared as part of the "Armed Groups Intelligence Project" of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). The Consortium was established in 1979 as a project of the National Strategy Information Center, a nongovernmental, nonpartisan research and policy center in Washington, DC. For twenty-five years the primary mission of CSI has been to identify appropriate intelligence practices for democracy. It also has promoted teaching and research on intelligence in a democratic society at the college and university levels.

In the aftermath of 9/11, there is broad recognition that the intelligence community, despite significant changes, requires major reforms to address new challenges. Among the most important are those posed by non-state armed groups, to include terrorists, guerrillas, militias, and organized criminal gangs. CSI's Armed Groups Intelligence Project focuses directly on this aspect of intelligence reform. The Consortium seeks to conceptualize a new intelligence model and identify effective intelligence practices to respond to major security challenges posed by these non-state armed groups. To do so, CSI is conducting research to draw on the professional experiences of former senior members of intelligence/ security services and former leaders of armed groups on three continents. Its findings and recommendations will be drafted later this fall.

ARMED GROUPS: A TIER-ONE SECURITY PRIORITY

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INTRODUCTION

Political violence, conflict, and war since the end of the Cold War have repeatedly pitted states against non-state armed groups or, in the case of inter-communal strife, multiple non-state armed groups against one another. This trend is not new. Various datasets that track armed clashes confirm that throughout the post-World War II era these types of conflict were numerous.¹

However, a number of developments in the 1990s enhanced the power and capacity of armed groups to attack the state. No longer do states possess a monopoly on the use of force within or across state borders. Armed groups — defined in this paper as insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations — have found innovative ways to use force in this arena. To survive and protect themselves, states must change how they deal with this threat because the proliferation of armed groups shows no sign of dissipating. Just the opposite appears to be the case: armed groups are here to stay for the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, as discussed below, some of these groups have undergone a profound transformation and now pose a long-term threat of the highest order to the United States. Al Qaeda has already demonstrated the capacity to strike inside America. Other terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, have the same potential, having established a significant presence in the United States.² And in Iraq, the spiraling insurgency following the conclusion of formal hostilities, despite the capture of Saddam Hussein, demonstrates the

direct threat these groups pose to US interests. Other armed groups pose more indirect threats.

Among the revolutionary innovations by armed groups in recent years is the stated intention of terrorist elements to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the United States and others. This apocalyptic scenario is more feasible than ever before because WMD are mobile, inexpensive, and do not require extensive facilities. The emerging threat from armed groups has fundamentally changed the nature of war in today's world, but nation-states, including the United States, have not treated this development as a tier-one threat and remain inadequately prepared to deal with it, both conceptually and operationally.

If the United States is to develop an effective policy and strategy to counter the threats posed by armed groups today and in the decades ahead, it must have a clear understanding of their characteristics. This paper provides an analytical framework for producing such assessments: *First*, it outlines the post-Cold War security context in which armed groups thrive. *Second*, the paper highlights the direct and indirect threats posed by armed groups today and their strategic impact on the United States. *Third*, it proposes an analytic framework for constructing an operational profile of an armed group. *Fourth*, the paper identifies trends that demonstrate that armed groups will continue to pose direct and indirect security challenges to the United States in the decades ahead.

POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Even before the Cold War ended, it was evident that new forces and actors were part of an evolving international security panorama. By the end of the 1990s, US government agencies and institutes

generated several studies that highlighted these structural changes and estimated their impact on stability and conflict in the 21st century.³ Non-governmental research centers produced similar studies.⁴ Finally, academic specialists in international relations and security studies published a plethora of books, monographs, and articles exploring the rapidly changing, and often disorderly, post-Cold War decade of the 1990s.⁵

A common theme running through these studies is the need for conceptualizing a new framework or paradigm that can account for a global environment in which the dynamics of change and the emergence of new actors have a powerful impact on the state and the Westphalian system.⁶ There is near unanimity that non-state armed groups are proliferating in number and importance. However, there is disagreement over the extent to which these new actors could effectively challenge state power.

James Rosenau's *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* provides an incisive description and analytic breakdown of the parameters of this new international structure. It consists of the following six developments, each of which accelerated in the 1990s by the rapid advance of information age technology:⁷

- *Shifting and increasingly porous borders;*
- *New patterns of economic growth and interaction;*
- *A changing distribution of power, capabilities, and authority;*
- *Increasing numbers of weak and disintegrating states;*
- *Proliferation of various kinds of non-state actors (NSAs);*
- *Emergence of new issues and alteration of traditional ones.*

While Rosenau does not believe that these developments will result in an end to the state, he marshals weighty evidence emphasizing that world affairs will no longer be dominated by state power. The broad scope of global politics, the arena within which political activities occur, and the relationships among actors are all changing drastically, says Rosenau, and will continue to do so.

Integration and Fragmentation

At the center of this new global milieu lie the interactive and seemingly contradictory processes of fragmentation and integration, which give rise to new spheres of power and authority. Fostering these twin phenomena are technological innovations in transportation and communications.

Integration, writes Rosenau, is reflected in the internationalization of capital and growth of markets, expansion of regional and transnational corporations and organizations, spread of shared norms (democratic practices, human rights, environmental protection, free enterprise), as well as the interdependence of issues.⁸

Integration's antithesis, fragmentation, is the result of a continuing allegiance to traditional or particularistic values and practices (i.e., ethnicity, ethnonationalism, and religious fundamentalism), a weakening of state authority, and the growing influence of armed groups at both the sub-state and trans-state levels.

Because fragmentation and integration alter the structure of a global political setting anchored in the nation-state, other diverse sources of power and authority — subsumed under the rubric of nonstate actors — now challenge the preeminence of the state. Bifurcation of world politics is the result. Moreover, a major outcome of bifurcation is growing violent discord between one category of in-

creasingly powerful NSA — armed groups — and increasingly weakened states.


Fragmentation and Failing States

Since 1945 the number of states has expanded from 51 to nearly 200. In almost every instance, upon achieving independence, this plethora of new governments was granted [sovereignty](#) and the imprimatur of legitimacy from the United Nations. However, achieving domestic legitimacy proved much more difficult for many of them. Some were able to do so, but a significant number of others embarked on the route or process of protracted state failure. According to Robert Rotberg: "The decade plus since the end of the cold war has witnessed a cascading plethora of [these] state failures, mostly in Africa but also in Asia. In addition, more and more states are at risk, exhibiting acute signs of weakness and/or the likelihood of outright failure."⁹

With the end of the Cold War this process of fragmentation escalated as armed groups increasingly challenged the authority and ability of states to rule, using a variety of means including terrorism, guerrilla insurgency, and other irregular and unconventional forms of organized violence. Several internal wars were the result.

The following map from Project Ploughshares' *Armed Conflicts Report 2003* depicts how the vast majority of these conflicts — focusing on the struggle for valuable resources, territorial independence, and religious and ethnic autonomy — flourished in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and central Europe in the past decade. They also occurred in Latin America and the Pacific region.¹⁰

The primary cause of these internal wars today can be found in the "domestic politics" of the state. The critical factor determining



Major sources: Human Development Report 1999; Armed Conflicts Report (Project Ploughshares).

Human Development Index and Armed Conflict

* Fifteen percent of the states ranked in the top half of Human Development Index 1998 experienced armed conflict during the period 1989-1996; 41

whether a state is viable or failing, according to K. J. Holsti, is legitimacy.¹¹ Strong and healthy states are those that exhibit several common characteristics or measures of legitimacy.

First, there is an implicit social contract between state and society, the latter being comprised of all ethnic, religious, political, and economic groupings. In other words, there is agreement on the political "rules of the game." There is loyalty to the state, the political principles upon which it is based, and its institutions.

Second, while legitimacy allows the state to extract resources, it also requires it to provide services and a reasonable amount of order, law, and security. Third, a clear boundary must exist between public service and personal gain. State power is not a platform for personal enrichment. Finally, no group is excluded from seeking political influence or receiving a fair share of resources and services because of its affiliation.

In the late 20th century, government legitimacy was eroding in many states in the Third World, while failing to take root in a number of post-communist states, according to *The Minorities at Risk Project* (MAR). It assesses the status and conflicts of politically- active communal groups in all countries with a population of at least 500,000. The project "contributes to the understanding of conflicts involving.. .over 285 groups."¹²

Based on this data the Center for International Development & Conflict Management recently published *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*. It finds that when compared with the high- water mark of the mid-1990s, internal or societal armed conflict was somewhat reduced in 2002. That is the good news.


However, it also explains that these trends are fragile.¹³ In the words of the report, "positive trends coexist with counter-trends that present major challenges to the emerging global community."¹⁴ Among the latter are the enduring causes of failing and failed states — weakened capacity, deeply divided societies, devastated economies, squandered resources, traumatized populations, civil societies crippled by war, international organized crime, and black market networks.¹⁵

Chester Crocker summarizes this situation succinctly: "Self- interested rulers.. .progressively corrupt the central organs of government." And they "ally themselves with criminal networks to divide the spoils." The authority of the state is "undermined. paving the way for illegal operations." In conjunction with these developments, "state security services lose their monopoly on the instruments of violence, leading to a downward spiral of lawlessness."¹⁶ Finally, "When state failure sets in the balance of power shifts.. .in favor of armed entities [groups] outside the law" who "find space in the vacuums left by declining or transitional states."¹⁷ **Lawless/Ungoverned Territory**

The "vacuum left by declining or transitional states" results, in turn, in the expansion of lawless and ungoverned areas that are beyond the authority of government. This creates safe havens in which armed groups can establish secure bases for self-protection, training, planning, and launching operations against local, regional, and global targets. Terrorist groups, as well as insurgent and criminal organizations, are located in the remote parts of more than 20 countries. These areas are distinguished by rugged terrain, poor accessibility, low population density, and little government presence.

For example, the confluence of such territory in several Central Asian states has made that region home to the following armed groups: a nascent insurgency in Afghanistan based in the tribal areas along the Pakistan border; Kashmiri insurgents located in Pakistan; the reduced insurgent movement in Uzbekistan; and elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda spread across this lawless area. Bin Laden himself is apparently hiding in the mountains of the Northwest Frontier province.

Reports in the spring of 2003 warn of the regrouping of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in this territory, and their alliance with the radical Islamist party Hizb-i Islami. According to the Afghan ambassador to India, "[t]hese elements think that America will be distracted by the war in Iraq, and that the United States will not stay in Afghanistan."¹⁸ The map below highlights this area.



In South America, about half of Colombia's national territory, abandoned for decades by the central government, is now controlled by a range of armed groups, including Marxist guerrillas, drug traf-

fickers, and right-wing paramilitary groups, each pursuing their own political and social agenda and the defeat of the state.

Lawlessness and ungovernability are not confined to remote rural territories. They can also be found in cities located in failing states. Urban areas can likewise provide safe havens for armed groups. Mogadishu is a case in point,¹⁹ as are the Pakistani cities of Karachi and Lahore. In the aftermath of the overthrow of the Taliban, many members of al Qaeda redeployed to the safety of these cities to coordinate attacks, recruit members, and solicit funds to continue their holy war against America.

NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND ARMED GROUPS

For a nation's intelligence and security services, armed groups pose different analytical and operational challenges from those of states. Understanding these differences is imperative today because, like their state counterparts, armed groups can now acquire the capacity to execute violent strikes that can have a strategic impact on even the most powerful nation-state. This capacity is new. This appears to be the case for one type of armed group in particular — inter-national terrorist organizations — as was demonstrated by al Qaeda on 9/11.

In effect, a revolution in terrorist affairs has occurred in the 1990s. This is analogous to a revolution in military affairs (RMA), in which the conduct of war dramatically changes as the result of major alterations by a nation-state in military organization, technology, doctrine, and/or leadership. According to Knox and Murray, "RMAs require the assembly of a complex mix of tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations in order to implement a new conceptual approach to warfare."²⁰

Consistent with this definition is the revolution in terrorist affairs carried out by al Qaeda in the 1990s. It had the desired impact of fundamentally altering the conduct of warfare. However, this innovation in the conduct of war was the work of a non-state armed group — a development that terrorist specialists, with few exceptions, appear to have considered not possible prior to 9/11.

The costs of that surprise attack by al Qaeda, documented below, illustrate this capability. Potential WMD attacks, an active goal of several armed groups, could far exceed the strategic impact of 9/11. In addition to these direct strategic threats, armed groups such as international criminal organizations can also challenge states in various indirect ways. **Evolution of the Non-State Armed Group Threat**

Over the last two decades, NSAs who operate both within and across state boundaries have increasingly challenged state supremacy. They can be divided into two principal categories — intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The former includes the UN, its sub-units, and regional counterparts. NGOs are far more diverse and far more numerous. Today they are estimated to number over 30,000. They seek to influence local, regional, and global agendas in ways consistent with their perspective or ideology. NGOs span virtually every facet of political, social, and economic life.²¹

While the image of the NGO is generally positive, those reporting on their growing numbers in the 1990s included in their classification violent armed groups — militias, insurgents, terrorists, and criminal cartels — in their classification. However, they downplayed the ability of these NSAs to confront the state through vio-

lent conflict in a major or strategic manner and categorized them as ancillary security problems, not first-order or top priority ones.

With few exceptions, US policymakers, and the security and intelligence organizations that served them, likewise failed to appreciate the growing salience and power of some non-state armed groups and were loath to consider them tier-one security threats that could undermine major interests or carry out attacks that could have a strategic impact. Only states had such power.

An examination of the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, produced annually through the 1990s by the White House, bears this out.²² While terrorist and criminal organizations are included, they are seen as secondary or tier-two/three security problems not requiring a military response. This point was driven home by the intelligence assessments of terrorist attacks against the United States beginning with the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Indeed, throughout the decade of the 1990s these terrorist strikes both inside the United States and abroad were classified as criminal acts, and few intelligence community officials and analysts were willing to consider these actions a clear and present danger to the United States — much less a form of war. Any attempt to describe terrorism in those terms ran into a stone wall of skepticism.²³

The US military in the 1990s likewise considered conflicts involving armed groups as minor contingencies. In fact, they classified them as "military operations other than war" (MOOTW) and "peace operations."²⁴ They were not considered first-order threats necessitating the use of regular military power against them.

This kind of thinking has to change. Armed groups today can no longer be classified in this way. However, that said, it is impor-

tant to understand how they differ both from the traditional threats posed by states, as well as among themselves.

To begin with, armed groups represent non-traditional challenges to a government's intelligence and security services that are unlike the conventional ones presented by states. These distinctions are important. They affect how a state threatened by an armed group understands, targets, and moves to counter it.

Among the essential dissimilarities between an armed group and a state is that the state maintains a formal, physical, and bureaucratic infrastructure. Furthermore, the policies and activities of the state, with few exceptions, are unconcealed. It has formal law making powers, and aspires to nationhood by seeking to achieve legitimacy and unity among its population. To accomplish this status, states look to establish a core of political values or ideals that their citizens embrace.

Some armed groups, as their ultimate objective, hope to attain some or all of these state characteristics. However, when an armed group begins to challenge a state through the threat or use of violence, it does not have these geographic, structural, bureaucratic, legal, political, or philosophical characteristics. While they may have overt front organizations, the activities of armed groups are generally clandestine. This is especially true of their violent operations, whether executed within the borders of their state adversaries or transnationally.

Furthermore, while a nation-state may take a democratic form and be based on the rule of law, armed groups cannot be democratic in ethos or organization, and do not comply with the rule of law in settling disputes. Armed groups are illegal organizations that do not

follow the democratic rules of the game. They do, however, seek to take full advantage of and exploit those state adversaries who do.

Increasingly, armed groups can acquire the potential to execute violent strikes that can have a strategic effect against the states they confront. While this may once have been true only of armed groups challenging weak and failing states, it is no longer the case. Today, even the most developed and powerful states are vulnerable to non- traditional security challenges fostered by certain armed groups that can take the form of ruthless attacks with strategic consequences. Armed groups who employ unconventional and asymmetric means in this way can target democratic and non-democratic states alike. **A Taxonomy of Armed Groups**

What constitutes an armed group? How many are there? How should they be differentiated from one another and categorized? What motivates them? To what extent do they cooperate with one another, as well as with states and other non-state actors? Can they be identified and countered in their emergent or incipient stage of development? Do armed groups provide policy opportunities as well as threats to policy? No taxonomy exists that rigorously addresses these questions, even though armed groups are the subject of increasing attention worldwide.

Consider how the Non-State Actors Working Group (NSAWG), a unit of the International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL), divides armed groups into the following categories: "rebel groups, irregular armed groups, insurgents, dissident armed forces, guerrillas, liberation movements, and de facto territorial governing bodies."²⁵ Not very rigorous! What is the difference between insurgents and guerrillas or irregular armed groups and dissident

armed forces? And can not a liberation movement be a *de facto* territorial governing body?

In its 2000 survey, the NSAWG identifies approximately "170 such non-state armed actors throughout the world." In doing so it observes that "[i]n ideology, objectives, strategies, form and level of organization, support-base, legitimacy and degree of international recognition," these groups "vary greatly."²⁶ This is accurate. However, what is interesting about the survey is not just the various groups included but those *excluded*. For example, there are no organized criminal groups; and al Qaeda, a transnational terrorist organization, also does not appear on the NSAWG list.

Claude Bruderlein, director of the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, likewise notes that "armed groups differ considerably, from Mafia-like militias to religious movements and corporate armies," making a common definition difficult.²⁷ He proposes that to qualify as an armed group, the following criteria must be satisfied:

[First,] combatants are organized according to a unitary command structure and.. commanders have at least a minimum of control over the conduct of the combatants. [Second,] the group is engaged in a political struggle.. to redefine the political and legal basis of the society through the use of violence. [Finally,] armed groups are independent from state control.²⁸

Here again, this definition excludes several types of armed groups.

For example, not all armed groups seek to "redefine the political and legal basis of the society through the use of violence." Clans and tribes in places like Afghanistan who seek to maintain the status quo are cases in point. And not all armed groups "are organized according to a unitary command structure." This is certainly true of al Qaeda, as well as many of the militias in failing states like Soma-

lia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, some armed groups are under the influence of a state. Consider Hezbollah in Lebanon, sponsored by both Iran and Syria.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) describes armed groups — which it calls Para-States — as entities that contest the state's "monopoly on the use of violence within a specified geographical territory."²⁹ FAS maintains profiles for 387 such organizations. To be included on the list, a Para-State or armed group has to have used force, defined by FAS as some form of "direct action or armed struggle."³⁰ Unlike the previous examples, those who developed the Para-State list "cast a wide net" that ranges from "criminal enterprises, such as substance distribution networks" to "national liberation movements," as well as those who "engage in terrorism."³¹

While these efforts to identify and define armed groups are steps in the right direction, a more parsimonious taxonomy is needed. We propose one that divides armed groups into four categories — insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized crime. First, here is what they have in common.

One, all armed groups, to varying degrees, challenge the authority, power, and legitimacy of the state. Some seek to do so by overthrowing the government and replacing it, while other armed groups attempt to weaken, manipulate, or co-opt the state.

Second, armed groups, at least in part, use violence and force, be it in unconventional and asymmetric ways. It is true that some armed groups maintain political and paramilitary wings, and that the former may for tactical reasons eschew violence. Still, the use of force is a critical instrument for these organizations, regardless of

how they may seek to mask that fact. Violence is used instrumentally to achieve political and/or other objectives.

Third, armed groups operate both locally and globally due to the developments of the information age, a point elaborated below. They are able to expand the battlefield to attack state adversaries both at home and abroad. Finally, as noted above, armed groups are not democratically based organizations. They do not adhere to the rule of law to resolve disputes. Just the opposite is the case.

These common features withstanding, insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations have many important differences between and among them. There is no generic or ideal type for any of these four variants. This is certainly true in terms of the basic characteristics or nuts and bolts of an armed group, which can be divided into the following six elements: 1) leadership; 2) rank and file membership; 3) organizational structure and functions; 4) ideology/political code of beliefs and objectives; 5) strategy and tactics; and 6) linkages with other non-state and state actors. How armed groups approach each of these issues will vary across and within the four categories of the taxonomy. Below each of the armed groups contained in the taxonomy will be defined, and key differences among them highlighted.

Insurgents. Insurgents can threaten the state with complex political and security challenges because of how they organize and operate. One specialist defines insurgents as armed groups that "consciously use political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."³² While a useful starting point, we propose a more comprehensive delineation:

Insurgency is a protracted political and military set of activities directed toward partially or completely gaining

control over the territory of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. The insurgents engage in actions ranging from guerrilla operations, terrorism, and sabotage to political mobilization, political action, intelligence/counterintelligence activities, and propaganda/psychological warfare. All of these instruments are designed to weaken and/or destroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government, while at the same time increasing the power and legitimacy of the armed insurgent group.

Within the parameters of this definition, insurgent groups take a number of different organizational forms ranging from complex political, intelligence, and military dimensions to narrowly structured conspiratorial groups.³³ The classic insurgent model is designed to mobilize supporters and establish an alternative political authority to the existing government, while employing intelligence and military means to attack and weaken the state through escalating violence. The more narrow conspiratorial variation, on the other hand, focuses more exclusively on using violence to undermine the will of a government to sustain losses and stay in the fight, and not on controlling a particular territory and building a parallel political apparatus in it.

Also affecting the approach taken by insurgents is the area or terrain in which they carry out their activities. They can take place in an urban and/or rural environment, as well as transnationally. Each of these locations will have an impact on how the insurgents approach each of the characteristics or elements of an armed group identified above — organization, ideology, motivation, leadership, membership background.

Where armed insurgent groups operate, the objectives they pursue, and the organizational approach they adopt will shape the strategy employed. In the classic insurgent model, that strategy goes

through four stages — pre-insurgency, organizational/infrastructure development, guerrilla warfare, and mobile conventional warfare. This can extend over a very long time. However, not all insurgencies seek to go through all four stages, and this will affect how they employ unconventional paramilitary tactics including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage. Often, insurgents receive assistance from states and, increasingly today, other NSAs.³⁴ This likewise affects the groups' organizational and operational profile.

Finally, armed insurgent groups have pursued very different objectives. During the Cold War, leftwing revolutionary and national liberation movements employed insurgency strategies. These movements took considerable time to establish complex political structures as a prelude to carrying out military operations. Their overall objective was to overthrow the state and carry out radical political and social change.

Starting in the 1980s this began to change. New types of insurgent movements appeared, based on existing ethnic and religious identities. This had a profound impact on the objectives pursued. Examples of the former include the Democratic Party (DPK) and Patriotic Union (PUK) of Kurdistan, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the armed clans fighting the Russians in Chechnya, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eel (LTTE). Religious cases include the People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) of Sudan, various Sikh and Kashmiri factions in India, and Hizballah in Lebanon.

Are there incipient or nascent indicators that can be identified by a state before an insurgency rises to the level of a serious threat to its stability and security? The answer is yes. And that is true not just for insurgents but for each of the armed groups included in the

taxonomy. However, most states faced with such challenges fail to see the early telltale signs and, consequently, do not take the necessary steps to prevent the situation from escalating. According to senior-level Pentagon and CIA officials interviewed for the study, this is certainly true of the US government, though they expressed doubt that such early and preventive steps are possible, given the existing organizational cultures in each agency.³⁵

Nevertheless, these indicators do exist, and they can be observed if the intelligence and security agencies are structured to do so. For example, a new group seeking to mount an insurgency must take certain steps. First, it must build an organization. If the state is vigilant it can see early signs of this such as the departure of a number of individuals from their homes for training and indoctrination or the defection of a noticeable number of members from moderate political parties. Increasingly radical political proselytizing by members of a heretofore unknown political group to draw people to it would be another early indicator.

Reports of people receiving political and paramilitary training or identification of non-government training facilities springing up inside the state or just across the border would be other signals. So would the discovery of small but growing amounts of arms and other materials needed for an insurgency. And money raising efforts to purchase these necessities would constitute further supporting evidence of the beginnings of an insurgency.

These and other early warning signals of the emergence of an insurgency — including evidence of linkages between the nascent insurgent organization and existing political parties, labor unions and other social groupings, and sporadic violence — do not take place in the dark. All of these activities, which begin small, are dis-

cernible. Intelligence and security services can discover them at the beginning or pre-insurgency stage of development. But to do so, a way of thinking has to be bread into the organizational culture of the intelligence and security services.

Terrorists: Terrorism and those armed groups who employ it have been defined in a myriad of ways.³⁶ Moreover, since the latter 1970s "terrorism" has frequently been used pejoratively to discredit and de-legitimize. With that in mind, a more operational definition is proposed:

***Terrorism** is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear by an armed group through the threat and/or use of the most proscribed kind of violence for political purposes, whether for or in opposition to an established government. The act is designed to have a far-reaching psychological effect beyond the immediate target of the attack and to instill fear in and intimidate a wider audience. The targets of terrorist groups increasingly are non-combatants, and large numbers of them, who under international norms have the status of protected individuals and groups.*

Terrorists differ from insurgents in several ways. Important distinctions can be seen in tactics and targeting. Insurgents use a number of political and paramilitary tactics, of which terrorism frequently is only one. Terrorist groups, on the other hand, have a more narrow operational approach that increasingly focuses on targeting non-combatants. Through the 1990s, terrorist groups were progressively more indiscriminate in their targeting, seeking to kill as many as possible from protected groups.

As with insurgents, terrorist groups in the 1990s were motivated more by ethnicity and religion. According to the RAND-St. Andrews University index, approximately half of all known terrorist groups were religiously focused.³⁷ Furthermore, not all, but an

overwhelming majority of these groups are located in the Islamic world.

Another important difference between terrorist and insurgent armed groups is the extent to which the former establish linkages and cooperative arrangements. During the 1990s, al Qaeda created an elaborate set of connections with a significant number of like-minded terrorist groups in as many as 60 countries. In effect, al Qaeda established a multinational alliance among armed groups that can operate in their originating states as well as transnationally. It also developed a sophisticated financial network for collecting and transferring money for the organization and its operations.³⁸

As with an insurgent movement, there are incipient indicators, identifiable by the state, of a terrorist group's ability to mount a serious threat against it. However, given that some terrorist groups can be quite small, this is difficult. Nevertheless, such groups still have to establish a clandestine organization, recruit and train personnel, acquire resources, meet and communicate, and so on. While they do so in secret, nonetheless these activities can be monitored.

As more is learned about al Qaeda's origins, early stages, and maturation, it becomes apparent that early warning indicators were there for the US intelligence community (IC) to collect and analyze. However, as more than one official from the IC explained to the authors during research for the study, such an approach is not part of the IC culture.

Militias: With the growing number of weak and failing states, a third category of armed groups — militias — became more numerous and prominent in the 1990s.³⁹ They appeared to thrive, in particular, in states with ineffectual central governments and to benefit from a global black market that facilitates their growth. While indi-

vidual militias received considerable international attention, particularly those in Africa and Central Asia, there have been few attempts to define this type of armed group in a systematic way or to identify different sub-types.

What is a militia? Below we propose a broad definition. Based on post-Cold War examples, armed militia groups appear to share the following characteristics:

*A **militia** in today's context is a recognizable irregular armed force operating within the territory of a weak and/or failing state. The members of militias often come from the under classes and tend to be composed of young males who are drawn into this milieu because it gives them access to money, resources, power, and security. Not infrequently they are forced to join; in other instances it is seen as an opportunity or a duty. Militias can represent specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, or other communal groups. They may operate under the auspices of a factional leader, clan, or ethnic group, or on their own after the break-up of the states' forces. They may also be in the service of the state, either directly or indirectly. Generally, members of militias receive no formal military training. Nevertheless, in some cases they are skilled unconventional fighters. In other instances they are nothing more than a gang of extremely violent thugs that prey on the civilian population.*

Within the parameters of this general characterization, militias can vary widely in terms of how they organize, recruit, operate, and conduct themselves. Furthermore, the literature on them is by far the weakest from an analytical perspective.

Several militias that emerged since the latter 1980s have been brutal in their use of violence, directing it more at civilians than at soldiers or other militias. In fact, in conflicts involving militias, civilians frequently are the target. This is especially the case in Africa. Untrained militia groups, often made up of youth who are forced to join and compelled to take part in initiation rituals involv-

ing frightful human rights abuses, are guilty of unspeakable crimes and atrocities, even against the tribe or clan they claim to represent.

Consider the situation in Cote d'Ivoire in the 1990s. Both anti- and pro-government militias were charged with widespread maltreatment of civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, these militias engaged in "systematic and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, [including] summary executions, arbitrary arrest and detention, disappearances, torture, rape, pillage, corporal punishment and other violent acts."⁴⁰

The same pattern can be seen in armed militia groups elsewhere in Africa. They plunder and pillage at will. These militias amount to little more than bandits, thriving in ungoverned areas although they sometimes try to don a veneer of ideological and political respectability. Examples of this are Foday Sankoh and the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, and his sponsor, Charles Taylor, in Liberia.

In other parts of the world militias have been more disciplined, less abusive of the population in general and of their own ethnic tribe or clan in particular, and led by men interested in local or regional political power. Afghanistan is a case in point. Still, there is no generic Afghan militia. Rather, they include various formations comprised of former mujahideen commanders, tribal contingents, seasonal conscripts, and foreign volunteers. The combat potential of these units varies considerably, ranging in strength from a few dozen to several hundred fighters, depending on the ability of their leaders and the resources available. To be sure, Afghan militias and their leaders threaten both the stability of the country and the current attempt by the United States and international community to build a post-Taliban government of unity.

Militias have been central players in the politics of other multiple identity countries as well. This has been true in Lebanon where many Lebanese seem to be more loyal to their confessional group or clan than their country. This was the case in the latter 1970s, when Lebanon plunged into civil war. For the next fifteen years confessional factions and their militias were locked in an intractable political fight in which Sunnis fought Shiites, Maronites fought Druze, Christians fought Muslims, and so on. When the civil war ended in the early 1990s, demobilizing these militias was not easy. Eventually, it took place, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began to slowly rebuild itself as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution. The LAF has extended central government authority over about two-thirds of the country. However, Hizballah retains its weapons and militia forces.

Another way militias differ has to do with leadership. There are those operating under the control of a recognized and powerful leader like the late General Aideed in Somalia. However, clan militias function under a decentralized collective leadership that seeks to protect or advance the interests of the clan. Many of the armed groups in Chechnya fit this description. There is no one identifiable leader.

Where strong militia leaders exist, "warlord" is often used in the media to describe them. As with other terminology employed to describe militias, this one also lacks analytic clarity. What is a warlord and how does he operate as a militia leader? One specialist describes modern-day warlords as "local strongmen able to control an area and exploit its resources and people while..keeping a weak authority at bay. Warlord's motives range from the advancement of clan, tribe, or ethnic goals to political ambition, localized power,

and personal wealth." Such individuals as General Dostum (Afghanistan), General Aiheed (Somalia), Walid Jumblat (Lebanon), Charles Taylor (Liberia), and Colonel Khudoiberidze (Tajikistan) are all prominent examples from the 1990s.⁴¹ But among these individuals there are important differences that the generic label "warlord" obscures.

These examples illustrate how widely militias can differ. Thus, any attempt to categorize them by how they organize, recruit, operate, and behave requires close attention to the cultural and political context in which they exist.

Militias impact areas beyond the borders of the states in which they operate and, in the aftermath of the Cold War, have engaged US interests and policy. As a result, Washington had to appreciate the complex nature of these disparate armed groups. Doing so, however, has been thorny. Not infrequently, the United States engaged in situations bereft of knowledge and suffered the consequences.

Consider Somalia in the early 1990s. When President Bush first deployed troops there it was not to take part in the carnage that had ripped that country apart. He sent American soldiers to do "God's work." Others in his administration referred to the operation as the "Immaculate Intervention."⁴² The objective — to feed the hungry, heal the sick, and bring order — was purely humanitarian, and was to serve as the model for using military forces in the post- Cold War world. However, to do so required an understanding of the Somalia militias and their clan base, an appreciation that the United States did not have. The ultimate result was the devastating 16-hour shootout between elite American soldiers and fierce Somali warriors in the urban canyons of Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993.

The US intervention in Afghanistan following 9/11 is also illustrative. To understand what goes on inside Afghan borders the key unit of analysis remains the tribe, even in the 21st century. This was the reality Washington faced following September 11th when it went to war with the Taliban, a radical Islamist regime that for several years had given sanctuary and succor to al Qaeda.

Washington aligned with the Northern Alliance, a compilation of different tribal factions — Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks — that had been fighting the Taliban for years. The Alliance reflected the traditional nature of politics and society in Afghanistan, where tribal groups and their leaders are central actors. The Department of Defense and CIA were unable to incorporate the majority Pashtun tribe into their operations. It proved unnecessary, but had more long-term implications that a sophisticated understanding of Afghanistan's tribal system would have signaled. In the aftermath of the war Washington found costly this expedient decision to ride the Northern Alliance to a quick victory. In order to stabilize and unify Afghanistan it had to bring all of the tribes together, demobilize their militias, and establish a national government of unity. That was tricky given both the course of action Washington pursued in the fall of 2001, and its belated understand Afghanistan's complicated tribal system.

As with insurgent and terrorist groups, there are identifiable incipient indicators of a militia's ability to threaten both regional stability and US interests. Information on those indicators, highlighted above, can be collected and analyzed. However, to do so requires that an intelligence service not only be geared to spot such developments early on, but also have a mature understanding of the culture and traditional setting in which militia groups flourish.

Organized Criminal Groups. The final category of armed group is that of organized crime. While certainly not new, it has grown in significance as a dangerous threat to individual states and the international system. The wealth and power of these organizations has burgeoned over the last 25 years, and several have established international linkages and networks.

Armed criminal groups today exhibit the following characteristics: First, they possess an identifiable structure and leadership whose purpose is to operate outside the law in a particular criminal activity. They maintain hierarchical arrangements with clearly demarcated leadership-subordinate roles, through which the group's goals are advanced. As such armed groups mature, they no longer rely on the leadership of one or a few individuals for their survival.

Second, these armed groups can take different forms and "operate over time [and space] not just for ephemeral [or temporary] purposes."⁴³ That is to say, they engage in more than one type of criminal enterprise and operate over large parts of a region or globally.

Third, armed criminal groups maintain internal cohesion and loyalty through ethnicity and the family ties of its members. They are anchored in a "community, family, or ethnic base." This provides the armed group with a code of behavior that entails "allegiance, rituals, ethnic bonds.. [to] help to engage the compliance and loyalty of individuals within the organization."⁴⁴ These "ties that bind" allow group members to trust one another in ways that are very personal, reducing the likelihood of law enforcement infiltrating the group.

Fourth, criminal organizations employ violence "to promote and protect their interests." It can be directed externally against

rivals to either intimidate or eliminate them as competitors. Internally, it maintains discipline and loyalty. While criminal organizations vary in the extent to which they employ violence, all do so "for business purposes."⁴⁵ If violence is the stick, criminal organizations also use the carrot of bribery. The availability of cash, in large quantities, is used to corrupt police and other government officials, seducing them to look the other way.

Finally, each of these characteristics contributes to the feature that distinguishes criminal organizations from other armed groups — they seek to maximize their profit, much like a legitimate business. The quest for money and the power that goes with it drives and sustains armed criminal groups. Based on the five characteristics described above, the following definition is proposed:

*An **armed criminal group** possesses a clandestine or secret hierarchical structure and leadership whose primary purpose is to operate outside the law in a particular criminal enterprise. Such groups frequently engage in more than one type of criminal activity and can operate over large areas of a region and globally. Often, these groups have a family or ethnic base that enhances the cohesion and security of its members. These armed groups typically maintain their position through the threat or use of violence, corruption of public officials, graft, or extortion. The widespread political, economic, social, and technological changes occurring within the world allow organized crime groups to pursue their penultimate objective — to make as much money as possible from illegal activities — in ways that their earlier counterparts could not.*

Major International Criminal Organizations (ICOs) have established linkages with other armed groups, and not just criminal ones. One of the more significant developments since the end of the Cold War is the increased involvement of insurgents, terrorists, and militia groups in criminal activities. Unable to rely on outside aid from state sponsors, which can be fleeting, many insurgent and terrorists

groups diversify their resource base by becoming involved with international criminal organizations. For ICOs, these partnerships are equally valuable, widening the scope and profitability of their operations.

A case in point is Hezbollah. Although Iran provides significant assistance, Hezbollah is involved in drug trafficking as another way of financing its activities. It provides opium production and transshipment protection to criminal organizations in exchange for financial and other kinds of support.⁴⁶ In Afghanistan, various armed ethnic groups are involved in similar activities, as was al Qaeda⁴⁷

Another example can be found in Colombia. Since the late 1980s, insurgents there cannot rely on financial support from states that once backed them. Therefore, some insurgent fronts of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) generate substantial revenue by taxing and protecting criminal enterprises involved in coca cultivation, cocaine processing, and drug shipments in the areas they control. It is estimated that this provides the FARC with as much as half of its revenues. And for the criminal groups this collaboration provides safe haven in which production can flourish. At the same time, official government support for paramilitary self defense groups, which control up to one-third of the national territory, waned. Groups such as United Self Defense of Colombia (AUC) in recent years have turned to drug trafficking for economic support, allying with leaders of Colombia's heroin trade as well as the cocaine cartels.⁴⁸

A final example can be found in Africa. Since the late 1980s the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone paid the

costs of their armed struggles from mining and illegally exporting diamonds through arrangements with international criminal syndicates. The problem of looting and illegal mineral exploitation by ICOs, among others, is perhaps best exemplified in the ongoing 30+ year war of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC — former Za- ire).⁴⁹

Yet an additional linkage that enhances the power of ICOs is the active partnership between political actors — officeholders and the staff of the legal-governmental establishment of a state — and criminal actors. These arrangements are termed the political- criminal nexus (PCN). It consists of varying degrees of cooperation among political and criminal participants at the local, national, and transnational levels.⁵⁰

An example of such a nexus is the relationship between Victor Bout, one of the world's largest illegal arms merchants, and different governments and rebel groups across Africa. Bout used the states of Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, and Central African Republic to register his aircraft. His organization purchased end-user certificates for tons of weapons from the governments of Burkina Faso, Togo, and Ivory Coast. And he provided not only small arms, but attack helicopters to Taylor's regime in Liberia, anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles to the RUF in Sierra Leone, and sophisticated mines and artillery to UNITA in Angola. Payment for the weapons was often in the form of diamonds from the rebel groups.⁵¹

Enhancing the Power of Armed Groups

Three factors enhanced the potential power of armed groups in the 1990s: globalization, information-age technology, and network- based approaches to organization.⁵² Each provided them with the opportunity to operate in ways that their earlier counterparts could

never imagine. As illustrated below, this is especially true for international criminal and terrorist organizations. While these three factors were touched on previously, they are highlighted here to underscore how each affords armed groups the potential capacity to attack even the most powerful states either directly or indirectly.

Globalization erodes the traditional boundaries that separated and secured the nation-state.⁵³ It allows people, goods, information, ideas, values, and organizations to move across international space without heeding state borders. Anyone with the necessary resources can do so. Modern transportation and communications systems, the movement of capital, industrial and commercial trends, and the post-Cold War breakdown of political and economic barriers not only in Europe but around the world accelerate the globalization process.

Information age technologies are central to globalization. These are the networks through which communications takes place — instantaneously — on a worldwide basis. Cellular and satellite phones allow contact between the most remote and the most accessible locations of the globe. Computers and the Internet are the other pillars of the information revolution. "No area of the world and no area of politics, economics, society, or culture," write Kegley and Wittkopf, "is immune from the pervasive influence of computer technology."⁵⁴

To take advantage of globalization and information-age technologies, non-state armed groups adopt new organizational strategies that are less hierarchical and more networked. They follow the lead of the business community, which is in the forefront of such change. Small and large corporations developed virtual or net-

worked organizations that were able to adapt to the information age and globalization.⁵⁵

The organizational design is more flat than pyramidal, with less emphasis on control from a central headquarters. Decision-making and operations are decentralized, permitting local autonomy, flexibility, and initiative. To operate globally, network-based organizations require a capacity for constant communications among dispersed units, a capability afforded to them by the World Wide Web and cellular networks.⁵⁶ Globalization, information age technology, and network-based organization not only empower international business, but also armed groups, to expand their activities across the world.

Contemplate the impact on international organized crime. In 2000, at the direction of President Clinton and as part of the International Crime Control Strategy, a US government interagency working group prepared a comprehensive assessment of the dimensions of the threat posed by international crime. The central theme of that report, captured in the following excerpt, is that criminal organizations embrace globalization and the information age to expand their operations worldwide:

Law enforcement officials around the world have reported a significant increase in the range and scope of international criminal activity since the early 1990s. The level and severity of this activity and the accompanying growth in the power and influence of international criminal organizations have raised concerns among governments all over the world — particularly in Western democracies — about the threat criminals pose to governability and stability in many countries and to the global economy. International criminal networks have been quick to take advantage of the opportunities resulting from the revolutionary changes in world politics, business, technology, and communications.⁵⁷

The threat assessment highlights the impact of globalization, information-age technology, and network-based organization. According to the working group, "[t]he dynamics of globalization, particularly the reduction of barriers to the movement of people, goods, and financial transactions across borders, have enabled international organized crime groups to expand both their global reach and criminal business interests."⁵⁸

To do so, ICOs take full advantage of revolutionary advances in communications and transportation technologies, notes the assessment. These are central to legitimate commercial activity in the 1990s, greatly quickening its pace, volume, and scope. And they "are daily being exploited by criminal networks worldwide.. Today's fast-paced global markets are easily used by criminal networks. Commercially available state-of-the-art communications equipment greatly facilitates international criminal transactions."⁵⁹

Before these developments transpired, ICOs did not have the organizational capabilities to operate on a global scale. Their "international" activities were more limited in scope, and any cells or units they had beyond their central base operated more or less autonomously and performed only a few specific functions for the criminal organization. In effect, for most organized crime groups, "international activities were more regional than global."⁶⁰ Now, according to the threat assessment, ICOs have adapted their organizations to establish "extensive worldwide networks and [organizational] infrastructures to support their criminal operations." These are "inherently flexible in their operations, adapting quickly to challenges from rivals and from law enforcement."⁶¹

Terrorist organizations follow the same pattern as their ICO counterparts, adapting to and taking advantage of globalization, in-

formation age technology, and network-based organization. Most notable in this respect is al Qaeda. In a 1997 interview bin Laden described his organization as "a product of globalization and a response to it."⁶² To be sure, it could not have operated in the 1980s as it did in the 1990s. Al Qaeda is a child of globalization. As with international businesses, globalization had a transforming impact on how and where al Qaeda organized and operated.⁶³

Unlike hierarchically structured terrorist groups of the 1980s, bin Laden established a networked organization of dispersed units that prior to 9/11 were able to deploy nimbly, almost anywhere in the world. Al Qaeda's doctrine, configuration, strategy, and technology are all in harmonization with the information age. During the 1990s, it created an elaborate set of connections with fronts, several likeminded terrorist groups, other types of armed groups, and terrorist-sponsoring states. Information-age technologies and cyber networks allowed al Qaeda to recruit, communicate, establish cells, and attack targets globally. The pattern that emerged was of a web of cells and affiliates around the world that could provide the intelligence and manpower needed to execute terrorist attacks against the United States and other targets. The 1998 East Africa embassy bombings and the 9/11 attacks are illustrative.⁶⁴ **The**

Direct Impact of Armed Groups

The developments outlined above now make it possible for certain armed groups to attack asymmetrically and strike at high-value or strategic targets of even the most powerful states. And these attacks can have strategic consequences for the states' policy. This is new and requires states to change their behavior in dealing with this threat. Of course, not all armed groups that exist today can reach

this level of power to constitute a tier-one threat to the United States.

An asymmetrical attack is one that seeks to circumvent or undermine an adversary's strengths and exploit his weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the adversary's mode of operations. While asymmetric options are a normal part of all wars, armed groups must pay closer attention to this approach because of the power differences between themselves and the states they are confronting. Given that imbalance, the asymmetrical techniques armed groups employ fall into the irregular, unconventional, and paramilitary categories of armed violence and warfare.

States confronted by armed groups often do not understand the significance of those challenges and frequently downplay the dangers they produce. Asymmetric threats work, in part, according to Colin Gray, by defeating a states' imagination. He argues that in the 1990s the United States was "trapped in a time warp of obsolescent political, ethical, and strategic assumptions and practices."⁶⁵ Evidence of this proposition can be seen in how the US intelligence community downplayed asymmetrical terrorist threats and even successful operations.⁶⁶

This lack of imagination coincided with the attainment by at least one armed group — al Qaeda — of the capacity to initiate operations against high-value US targets across the globe. In other words, they could undertake an action or series of actions that, if successful, struck targets of major political, economic, or military importance. A small number of strategic specialists went so far as to propose that this constituted a transformation in war and permitted irregular forces to challenge states with strategic asymmetric

attacks, ones that could cause a significant change in the direction of a states' foreign and national security policies.⁶⁷

War, said the specialists, was undergoing big changes — transformation — and entering a whole new stage that they called fourth-generation warfare.⁶⁸ The engine of that change was the non-state armed group. Violence by armed groups could now have a strategic impact on both weak and strong states. It was this capability, facilitated by globalization, network-based organization and information age technologies that provided the potential for armed groups to move from second- or third-order ancillary security threats to first-order ones for the United States.

As noted earlier, when states radically alter the prevailing approach to war it is called a revolution in military affairs. Al Qaeda was the first non-state armed group to have such an impact on the conduct of war, which it demonstrated through its attacks in the 1990s, culminating with the operation on September 11th. Al Qaeda carried out fourth-generation warfare against a major state power. Here are its precepts:

- *4th generation warfare is irregular, unconventional and decentralized in approach.*
- *Asymmetrical operations are employed to bypass the superior military power of states and attack political, economic, population, and symbolic targets in order to demoralize the psyche of both government and its populace.*
- *The organization and operations of 4th generation warriors are masked by deception, denial, stealth and related techniques of intelligence tradecraft.*
- *They exploit information-age technologies. The development of network-based terrorist organizations connected transnationally through cell phones, fax machines, e-mail, web sites, and the Internet provides global reach.*

- *Modern transportation technologies have a profound impact on this new battlefield. Not only are there no fronts but the old distinctions between civilian and military targets is irrelevant.*
- *Laws and conventions of war do not constrain terrorists as they seek new means, to include WMD, to attack civilians and nonmilitary targets to inflict terrible carnage.*
- *4th generation warriors, frequently in the name of God, are remorseless enemies for the states they challenge, employing unlimited violence, unencumbered by compassion.*
- *The organization has a broad financial base, built on different pillars that constantly adapt to state pressure. Individual donors support the radical agenda, charities and NGOs are infiltrated and exploited with and without the consent of the organizations, and "legitimate" banks and businesses are used as fronts to hide and move the network's resources.⁶⁹*

In the past, when a state revolutionized the conduct of war, other states sought to follow suit and emulate those changes. It is conceivable, even probable, that other armed groups will seek to learn from and replicate al Qaeda's conduct of war.⁷⁰

Al Qaeda's operations since the early 1990s — both successful and unsuccessful — reveal a pattern of attacks that aimed at hitting high-value/strategic targets of the United States. Clearly, this was the objective in the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. It came up short, but not by much. The unit carrying out the attack placed the truck within yards of the location that would have brought the building down.

Other examples were the attacks on major US warships, also strategic targets. There were at least two such operations. The first sought to sink the Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer, the *USS Sullivans*. The operation took place in January 2000 but failed

because the would-be martyrs overloaded their boat with explosives and it sank before reaching the ship.

The next operation was more successful. Al Qaeda operatives nearly sank the *USS Cole* on Oct. 12, 2000 with an asymmetrical operation in Aden. Had the *Cole*, also an Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer, gone down, the operation could have had strategic consequences forcing changes in US counterterrorist policy. After all, the *Cole* is one of the most powerful surface combatants ever put to sea. It cost one billion dollars to build and 240 million dollars to repair. However, nearly sinking it was not enough to force a radical change in US policy.

These and other successful and unsuccessful attacks were a prelude to 9/11. However, Washington did not understand the consequences of these operations and the need to change counterterrorist policy. Al Qaeda's attacks were downplayed. The US government could not imagine that these strategic strikes could escalate to the level of 9/11 and plunge the nation into war.⁷¹

The costs inflicted that day can only be characterized as devastating, with serious strategic consequences. Consider what they accomplished. First, approximately 3,000 Americans lost their lives. Then there were the immediate and long-term economic costs of 9/11. These include costs to New York City, the insurance and airlines industries, the economy, and the price of preventing future attacks.

The costs to New York City alone were staggering. There is the bill for cleanup of the site and repair or replacement of related infrastructure. This includes a replacement cost of \$21.8 billion for the WTC buildings destroyed in the attack; \$4.5 billion to repair adjacent buildings in and around the trade center complex; \$4.3 bil-

lion to restore damaged transportation facilities and utility lines for telecommunications and power; \$5.2 billion to replace tenant assets; and \$1.1 billion for removal of the rubble.⁷²

The costs to the city's economy are equally high. For example, in the year following the attack jobs in the securities industry fell by between 17% and 20%. Other industries, including business services, printing, restaurants and hotels were hit equally hard. The overall cost in gross city product calculated through fiscal 2002 was between 52.3 and 64.3 billion, depending on what was included.⁷³

Moving outside of NYC there was the impact of September 11th on the insurance industry, the "largest single insured event loss in history." Estimates range from "\$30 to \$58 billion," based on a combination of property/casualty and health/life losses.⁷⁴ And this does not include the more long-term impact on insurance premiums. The effects on the airlines industry were analogous. According to a Booz-Allen-Hamilton study, during 2002 the annual revenues for the airline industry fell by 35-40%. Not surprisingly, this led to a number of bankruptcies, the layoff or furlough of 90,000 employees, a decline in passenger traffic by 22% domestically and 37% internationally, and a cut in airline capacity by approximately 16%.⁷⁵

In addition to NYC-related costs and costs associated to specific industries, the overall national economy was also shaken by the 9/11 events. Spillovers from the industrial side impacted some macroeconomic areas. Although the United States economy was already in a slowing down trend, the environment that emerged at the end of 2001 spoke of a recession closely associated with the attacks on the World Trade Center. For example, general consumer, business, and investor confidence took a nosedive and employment

loss continued to grow. Three years later, economic assessments indicate that although the local and industry specific costs were relevant, the total economic impact of the attacks was not as high as originally forecasted. Nonetheless, one should note that although the American economy proved resilient there are specialists who believe that future terrorist attacks could actually have an important long-term impact on the economy.

Finally, there are the costs of defending against future attacks. While this is also hard to gauge, it is clear that it will be high. For example, following the attack the 2002 approved spending for antiterrorism was supplemented by \$20 billion. Next, the Homeland Security structure was established with a fiscal year 2003 price tag of \$38 billion.⁷⁶ Then there is the cost of the war and its aftermath in Iraq.

Al Qaeda is the first transnational armed group to have made such revolutionary breakthroughs in terms of its ability to use violence in new ways to level direct strategic blows against the United States with strategic consequences. However, an armed group could achieve the same strategic impact on US interests and policies using more standard forms of terrorist and insurgent violence. The insurgents, militias, and terrorists attacking coalition forces in Iraq are a case in point. These assaults have seriously and rapidly spiraled since the end of the conventional war in April 2003. Each day the headlines report more and more violence carried out through mortar and rocket strikes, ambushes, sniper attacks, assassinations and suicide operations, all standard non-state armed group methods.

This escalating killing could have dire strategic consequences for US foreign policy not just in Iraq but globally if it is not countered and defused. It is already cutting into public support at home.

If that support continues to atrophy it could weaken and even put an end to the US commitment and its long-term reconstruction and democratization program for Iraq.

If this sequence of events unfolds in Iraq in a way that culminates in a US withdrawal before these objectives are reached, Washington will once more be seen by both friends and enemies as unwilling to meet the commitments it makes to others. Thus, armed groups will have inflicted a strategic defeat on the United States with a host of very serious and long-term ramifications.

So far, we have examined situations in which armed groups constitute direct and strategic threats to US foreign policy. Are there also instances, to be sure fewer, where the United States may find it in its strategic interest to provide assistance to an armed group? We believe the answer can be yes. In the 1990s, two such opportunities were on the table.

First, there was the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Through the latter 1990s, the United States eschewed their requests for help in fighting the Taliban, who were closely aligned with al Qaeda. A serious program of assistance to the Northern Alliance as one part of an overall strategy to go after al Qaeda would have put the latter on the defensive. Having to worry about its own security and very survival would have meant less time to plan and execute operations against American targets.

The second example in the 1990s was the Iraqi resistance. Here also requests for assistance generally fell on deaf ears in Washington. The one exception, which was very limited in scope, ended in disaster when the United States backed out. Robert Baer, the CIA case officer who headed that failed covert program in northern Iraq, has chronicled the debacle in his book, *See No Evil*.⁷⁷ Could a seri-

ous program of paramilitary and political assistance to the Iraqi resistance have succeeded against the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein? Perhaps. But Washington policymakers in the 1990s were not willing to give that option any meaningful consideration. **The Indirect Impact of Armed Groups**

In addition to asymmetrical attacks against high-value targets, there are other indirect ways armed groups can affect the interests and policies of the United States. For example, they can do so by destabilizing states and/or regions that are of critical importance to the United States. These indirect threats, while not of the same magnitude as those described above, nevertheless, can affect important US interests in various ways.

Take the example of regions where the stability and development of states is undermined by collaboration between the political establishment and armed criminal groups. The political-criminal nexus (PCN), as noted earlier, represents collaboration between political and criminal actors at the local, national, and transnational levels. Where a criminal group has endured and prospered, in most instances, it has reached some type of accommodation with political authorities.⁷⁸

Such active partnerships can undermine the rule of law, human rights, and economic development. They can also create ungoverned areas where armed groups can flourish. In some areas, the problem of the PCN is chronic, for example in Mexico, Nigeria, and Turkey. In other countries and regions — Colombia, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Caucasus — the problem is more acute, violent, and often can dominate political, economic, and social life.

States offer other benefits to criminal organizations. They can issue criminals internationally-recognized diplomatic passports,

provide end-use certificates to help make illegal arms sales appear legal, facilitate the entry and exit of criminal elements to certain countries, reducing the risk of capture, and provide banking facilities to organized criminal groups.

An example of this is Liberia, where the government of Charles Taylor helped several Russian organized crime figures carry out business and weapons sales across Africa. Among those he dealt with were Victor Bout and Lenoid Menin. Bout, in turn, supplied weapons and aircraft to the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

In the summer of 2001, Taylor also allowed senior al Qaeda operatives to enter Liberia and purchase large quantities of diamonds, a move that may have allowed al Qaeda to move many of its resources out of banks, where they could be frozen, and into an easily protected and convertible commodity.⁷⁹

These situations constitute security problems because they can interfere dramatically with the functioning of state and society, undermining political, economic, and social infrastructure. The instability generated can affect not only the state and region in which it takes place, but can also have negative implications for US policy interests. In each of the countries and regions identified above as having acute PCN problems, the US interests range from important to vital.

This is especially true of Afghanistan, one of the main battle grounds in the war against terrorism. The nexus between ICOs and local warlords undermines US efforts to establish post-Taliban stability, the rule of law, and economic development. Instead, major parts of Afghanistan remain outside the control of the interim government, headed by Hamid Karzai. And in those areas, drug production and trafficking remain serious problems, ones that neither

the United States nor the UN, in conjunction with the interim government, thus far has been able to establish a coordinated program for combating.

And this contributes, according to the 23 July 2003 report on the situation in Afghanistan to the UN Security Council, to an "overall security situation throughout Afghanistan [that] remains fragile and, in many areas, exhibits signs of deterioration."⁸⁰ Moreover, in those areas outside government control al Qaeda terrorists said to be aligned with the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar "have stepped up their activities."⁸¹

Another example where the development of a political-criminal partnership can affect US interests is Russia, a political system in transition with a thriving PCN. For Washington, the activities of PCNs in Russia are particularly threatening because of the presence of WMD. PCNs can facilitate their acquisition by armed groups hostile to the United States.⁸²

As in the previous section on direct threats, here also the focus has been on how through indirect ways armed groups can negatively affect the interests and policies of the United States. However, it is also worth noting that there can be situations in which providing assistance to an armed group would support a more indirect interest of Washington.

PROFILING ARMED GROUPS

What are the key operational characteristics of armed groups? What do we need to know about each of these characteristics in order to assemble a comprehensive depiction or profile of them? Preventing and countering the challenges of armed groups requires as a first step an understanding of these key operational traits. Only then can the United States and other states facing the kinds of armed

group threats outlined in this paper respond with effective counter- measures.

To gain that understanding it is necessary to construct a systematic profile of how the armed group attacking the state is organized and the ways in which it functions. The development of such a profile will provide an understanding of the armed group at both the strategic and tactical levels, and should serve to guide the ways in which the states' intelligence and security services plan and conduct operations against such unconventional adversaries.

What follows is a framework for profiling armed groups. It may be adapted for use not only against armed groups already attacking the state, but also as a tool for identifying ones in their formative stages. Used in this manner the framework may allow the state to take preventive measures, defusing a threat before it reaches the stage of serious armed violence. To do so, the intelligence and/or security services of the state must think in this way, embracing an ethos that seeks to prevent armed groups from emerging rather than only taking action after the attacks have begun.

For democratic states in general, and the United States in particular, such an approach is highly unusual. It almost never takes place. Recall what senior-level Pentagon and CIA officials cited above had to say about possibility of the United States taking early and preventive steps against armed groups in their formative stages. The existing organizational cultures in each agency are not capable of doing so. Can America afford to remain aloof to such preventive measures in a future where armed groups seek to execute operations much more destructive than 9/11?

Finally, this framework could also be adapted and employed to construct a systematic profile of an armed group that the United States found in its interest to support.

Understanding Operational Characteristics: A Framework

The characteristics of armed groups can be divided into the following six categories: 1) leadership; 2) rank and file membership; 3) organizational structure and functions; 4) ideology/political code of beliefs and objectives; 5) strategy and tactics; and 6) linkages with other non-state and state actors. Each of these characteristics, defined below, is important to the success of an armed group. The order they are listed here should not be construed as signaling their degree of significance. All are crucial to success.

The context or situation particular to each armed group also matters. It will influence and shape how the group approaches each of these six factors. Armed groups cannot consider these factors in the abstract or adopt formulas that have worked for others without close attention to the circumstances in which they are waging a conflict against a state, as well as against other armed groups. Indeed, the geographic, historical, political, economic, and social milieu determines how an armed group develops its overall strategy and operations.

Each of these six characteristics generates a series of key questions, the answers to which fill in the details of the armed groups' operational profile. What follows is a delineation of each of the six characteristics and an elaboration of the kinds of questions that a comprehensive assessment of each should address, in order to craft as complete a profile as possible of an armed group.

1) Leadership

Competent leadership is manifestly indispensable to all organizations, and especially armed groups, which generally challenge much stronger state organizations. Leadership is a key ingredient for identifying and accomplishing the goals and objectives of the armed group. Therefore, an understanding of the roles, styles, personalities, and abilities of its leaders is critical.

At minimum, the leader(s) of an armed group must devise an appropriate code of political beliefs and/or set of objectives, create an appropriate organization, and employ the instruments of power and influence available in an effective manner. Therefore, in profiling the leadership, the following key questions should be collected on and answered:

- *What are the social, economic, and political origins of the leaders of the armed group?*
- *What is the worldview and political-social perspective of the leaders of the armed group?*
- *What motivates an individual to become a leader of an armed group?*
- *How does an individual gain the legitimacy and moral authority to achieve leadership status in an armed group?*
- *How are leaders able to attract a committed group of able lieutenants and followers?*
- *What role do charisma, personal magnetism, commitment, audacity, and practicality play in leadership effectiveness?*
- *What are the different political, organizational, communications, motivational and paramilitary skills and capabilities of the armed group's leader(s)? How do these skills contribute to armed group effectiveness?*
- *What factors contribute to leadership limitations and ineffectiveness?*

- *What are the political and other differences among leaders of the armed group? How sharp are these differences? How do these differences affect cooperation and interaction among members of the leadership?*

2) Rank and File Membership

In order to offset the advantages and superior resources of government, the leaders of armed groups must be able to identify and recruit able and skilled individuals into the organization and to train, motivate, and retain them. How do they accomplish these objectives? What methods and approaches do they use? To gain insight into these issues the states' security and intelligence services must answer the following questions about the armed groups' rank and file membership:

- *What societal, demographic, and gender elements do leaders target for recruitment? Are they from divergent social groupings? Is there an attempt to build cross-cutting alliances and coalitions? How effective are these efforts? Do political differences among divergent elements of the armed groups' membership create problems for group cohesiveness? To what extent is this the case?*
- *Does recruitment focus on activists and individuals willing to make a strong commitment to the armed group, or is there also recruitment of those who play a more passive role in the organization?*
- *What kinds of techniques are used to identify, appeal to, and recruit individuals?*
- *Once recruited, how are individuals trained for specific tasks within the armed group?*
- *How are recruits motivated and retained?*

3) Organizational Structure, Functions, and Resources

Armed groups adopt various organizational models that can differ widely along structural and functional lines. Organization functions to channel the energies and skills of members toward the

realization of its goals and objectives. Organizations also have to acquire resources to support their activities. Organization is the key to effective communications, political activities, intelligence operations, and paramilitary actions, all crucial ingredients of an armed group's success. Therefore, an understanding of how an armed group approaches these matters necessitates close attention to the following issues:

- *What are the scope, location, and complexity of the organization? Is it small and conspiratorial or does it have the more complex structure of a shadow government?*
- *Is the organization hierarchical or network based?*
- *How are decisions made in the organization? Is it centralized or do local units and branches have autonomy to act?*
- *What are the organization's functionally specific sub-units (e.g., military, intelligence, political, financial)?*
- *What kinds of intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities does the armed group have, and how important is each to the leadership?*
- *What is the groups' financial structure and network? How does it raise and move money? How does the armed group acquire resources to support its activities and what kinds of resources does it need?*
- *How cohesive is the organization?*
- *Does the armed group suffer from factionalism and disunity? To what extent is this a problem, and how does it affect the functioning of the organization? Is it a serious problem?*
- *What other weaknesses does the organization have?*

4) Ideology/Political Code of Beliefs and Objectives

Armed groups may follow a coherent ideology or a more *ad hoc* set of political beliefs and objectives that perform a number of crucial socio-political and psychological functions important to the

effectiveness of the armed group. Whatever form it takes, all armed groups — insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations — require a set of ideas, beliefs, values, and legends that bind the group together.

During the Cold War armed groups tended to be committed to various leftwing ideologies. In the post-Cold War period ethnic, ethnonational, and religious ideologies have predominated. In other cases, armed groups are motivated by financial and other objectives. To assess this characteristic of an armed group the following subjects require scrutiny:

- *What is the ideological, political, or other basis for the armed group?*
- *To what extent does it offer an alternative set of values and a new political-social vision and plan?*
- *How effective is it in creating a social-psychological sense of unity, solidarity, collectivity, and commitment within the armed group?*
- *To what extent is it able to rationalize, justify, and legitimize the actions taken by the armed group including the use of violence?*
- *How is it used as a tool for recruitment and mobilization?*
- *What are its weaknesses and shortcomings?*

5) Strategy and Tactics

Armed groups employ a range of different tactics to achieve their objectives. Sometimes these are integrated into a coherent strategy. This tends to be more the case for insurgents and terrorist groups. Militias and criminal organizations, on the other hand, are more likely to employ tactics in an *ad hoc* and diffuse manner. Whatever the approach to strategy and tactics, the following issues should be addressed in this part of the armed group profile:

- *To what extent has the armed group developed a formal strategy?*
- *What types of political and psychological tactics does it use?*
- *What kind of armed violence is employed and against what targets?*
- *How effective are these different tactics? How coordinated are they? Is there an overall strategy that coordinates and integrates these various tactics?*
- *How flexible is the armed group in adapting its strategy and tactics to meet a dynamic and changing environment?*
- *What are their shortcomings and weaknesses in the armed groups strategy and tactics?*

6) Linkages with other Non-State and State Actors

Finally, armed groups often establish linkages with other state and non-state actors for a number of tactical and strategic reasons. These include acquiring various kinds of resources, be they political, intelligence, financial, or military. Since armed groups are almost always weaker than the states they challenge, they frequently seek the assistance and resources of others to level the playing field, even though this does not come without costs to the group. With respect to the nature and extent of these linkages, here are the key questions the state should focus on in this final part of the profile:

- *To what extent have linkages been established between the armed group under investigation and other state and non-state actors?*
- *What purposes do those linkages serve?*
- *To what extent does the armed group rely on external support? What kinds of resources does it receive from other state and non-state actors?*
- *What must it do in return for this assistance?*

KEY FINDINGS AND FUTURE TRENDS

There is little to suggest that threats by armed groups — direct and indirect — are a temporary post-Cold War phenomenon. What the trend lines and data bear out is that armed groups will continue to pose serious and increasingly dangerous first-order security challenges to states, the United States included, into the foreseeable future. The following indicators substantiate this supposition.

First, statistics on the number of weak states and the concomitant problem of ungovernability demonstrate this is not a temporary but chronic international challenge. The number of weak, very weak, and failed states is significant.

Second, topographical mapping of lawless/ungoverned areas reveals the extent to which these locales cover significant territory.

Third, armed groups, of which there are several hundred, are a growing topic of analysis and concern. Recognition of armed groups as important and dangerous actors on the world stage is growing.

Fourth, internal conflicts, many with transnational dimensions, while somewhat fewer than in the latter 1990s, remain a dominant cause of violence and instability in many regions of the world according to the experts.

Fifth, scenarios and government exercises of the impact armed group violence can have, especially if it crosses the WMD threshold, likewise reveals the magnitude of this non-traditional threat today. And these scenarios are reflective of the stated intentions of specific armed groups.

Weak States: A Chronic International Problem

A number of organizations have compiled data to assess the global trends in governance. This data provides a macro-level view

of the extent to which weak states and ungovernability constitute a chronic international problem that facilitates internal conflicts and wars. Of these, the recently revised World Bank's dataset is perhaps the most multifaceted measurement tool for assessing how countries perform in this critical area of development.

The World Bank defines governance as that set of traditions and institutions by which authority in a state is or is not exercised legitimately and effectively. This includes the process by which government is selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens for the institutions that govern economic and social interaction. To measure how well or poorly each nation governs, the World Bank collected and analyzed data on six indicators.⁸³ These include: 1) voice and accountability; 2) political stability and absence of violence; 3) government effectiveness; 4) regularity quality; 5) rule of law; and 6) control of corruption.⁸⁴

For each time period covered by the World Bank,⁸⁵ states were assigned a score ranging from 2.5 (highest) to -2.5 (lowest) for each of the six governance indicators. These six scores were then averaged to create a single governance measure for every country. To better understand the meaning of a 2.5 to -2.5 rating, this aggregate governance measure is expressed in percentiles of 0-99, with the latter representing the highest level of governance.

The World Bank divides these governance scores into four sections or quartiles. The highest governance scores range from 75th to 99th percentile. The second best quartile includes 50th to 74th percentile. Governance ratings equaling 25th to 49th percentiles are the second lowest section. And the lowest quartile is comprised of scores up to the 24th percentile. We initially labeled these quartiles

"good, fair, weak, and very weak" governance scores. However, in order to better represent the extremes that exist in the world, the top and bottom ten percentiles are further identified as "excellent" and "failed." Thus, "excellent" governance corresponds to a numerical score of 90-99; "good" governance 75-89; "fair" 50-74; "weak" 25-49; "very weak" 10-24; and "failed" 0-9.

What an analysis of the data demonstrates is that weak, very weak, and failed states constitute a significant and enduring challenge for the world community. This can be seen below by comparing 1996 with 2002. The costs of corruption, weak economies, deteriorating infrastructures, and poor governance all facilitate this state of affairs and the instability and conflict that accompany it.⁸⁶ Indeed, those states that have experienced violent conflict and internal war due to an increase in ethnic, cultural, or religious tensions serve as breeding grounds for the illicit activities of armed groups. The rating for each country is based on its average score on the six governance factors. Not every country in every region received a score because data was not available for a small number of states.

For 2002, approximately half of all countries are categorized as "weak, very weak or failed." Furthermore, another one-fifth is ranked as "fair." This means that only about 20 percent of the states of the world consistently fall within the "excellent" and "good" categories. The World Bank data can be disaggregated by region for the periods covered. By doing so, it becomes apparent that significant governance challenges exist in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America (including the Caribbean).

Based on 2002 data, of Africa's 53 states, nine are assessed as having "fair" governance, with the remainder falling into the "weak, very weak, and failed" categories. Within the region, West, East,

2002 Governance Summary by Region

<i>Region</i>	<i>States</i>		<i>Excellent</i>		<i>Good</i>		<i>Fair</i>		<i>Weak</i>		<i>V. Weak</i>		<i>Failed</i>
	<i>#</i>	<i>%</i>											
Africa	53	38%	0	(0%)	0	(0%)	9	(17%)	22	(42%)	1	(25%)	9 (17%)
Asia	36	18%	0	(0%)	3	(8%)	6	(17%)	11	(31%)	3	(31%)	2 (6%)
Europe	42	21%	14	(33%)	1	(24%)	7	(17%)	6	(14%)	1	(2%)	0 (0%)
LatAmer/Carib	38	19%	0	(0%)	9	(24%)	1	(32%)	12	(32%)	2	(5%)	1 (3%)
Middle East	16	8%	0	(0%)	1	(6%)	7	(44%)	3	(19%)	3	(19%)	1 (7%)
N America	2	1%	1	(50%)	1	(50%)	0	(0%)	0	(0%)	0	(0%)	0 (0%)
Oceania	13	15%	2	(15%)	0	(0%)	1	(8%)	6	(46%)	0	(0%)	0 (0%)

1996 Governance Summary by Region

<i>Region</i>	<i>States Excellent</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Fair</i>	<i>Weak</i>	<i>V. Weak</i>	<i>Failed</i>	
	# %						
Africa	53 38%	0 (0%)	2 (4%)	7 (13%)	27 (51%)	10 (19%)	7 (13%)
Asia	36 18%	0 (0%)	3 (8%)	5 (14%)	15 (42%)	6 (17%)	3 (8%)
Europe	42 21%	11 (26%)	10 (24%)	8 (19%)	7 (17%)	2 (5%)	0 (0%)
LatAmer/Carib	38 19%	0 (0%)	5 (13%)	10 (26%)	14 (37%)	1 (3%)	0 (0%)
Middle East	16 8%	0 (0%)	2 (13%)	6 (38%)	3 (19%)	2 (13%)	1 (6%)
N America	2 1%	2 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Oceania	13 15%	2 (15%)	0 (0%)	3 (23%)	3 (23%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)

and Central Africa are all troubled, with several armed conflicts taking place. In the Middle East, governance scores for 2002 are reported for 15 states. With one exception, they are all grouped in "fair" (7), "weak" (3), "very weak" (3) and "failed" (1) categories.

Almost two-thirds of the states of Asia are ranked by the World Bank as "weak, very weak, and failed," most of which are located in the central, southwest, and southeast parts of the region. The strongest sub-region is in East Asia with Japan and South Korea. Similar to Africa, the weakest states also have the highest rates of instability and conflict.

Although more countries receive "good" or "fair" governance scores in Latin America and the Caribbean than in the previously discussed regions, approximately 40 percent fall into the "weak, very weak, and failed" categories. Not surprising, states such as Colombia, which experience high levels of internal conflict, also receive correspondingly low governance marks.

A review of nations categorized as "failed" reveals an interesting pattern. In the past 20 years, the United States has almost exclusively sent troops to countries receiving "very weak" or "failed" ratings. Furthermore, in the past 10-15 years, the United States has identified most of those countries as safe havens for terrorists. These include Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, the Balkans, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia.

In sum, the World Bank dataset provides empirical evidence of the extent to which "weak, very weak, and failed" states constitute a chronic international problem, facilitating internal conflicts with transnational dimensions. This macro-level assessment demon-


strates that it is precisely in those types of states that armed groups find safe haven free from government authority and control. **The Geography of**

Lawless/Ungoverned Territory


There is growing recognition of the extent to which law- less/ungoverned areas within and/or across the borders of very weak and failed states provide various armed groups with a safe haven in which they can establish secure bases for training, planning, and launching operations locally, regionally, and globally. The darker shades on satellite maps below identify six lawless/ungoverned regions.

These remote territories are not all the same in terms of the types of armed groups present. Some regions have each of the four identified in this study — terrorists, insurgents, militias, and criminals. In other locations, fewer can be found. What is increasingly clear about all of these lawless/ungoverned areas is that they cover significant territory, are attractive to a range of armed groups, and governments where they are located are unable, on their own, to meet the challenges of these illicit actors. They lack the economic, military, intelligence, and police power to do so. What follows is a brief examination of each region.


Mexico to Honduras. The first region is the area stretching from southern Mexico through Guatemala to El Salvador and Honduras. Narco-traffickers, insurgents, and other criminal gangs are all found there. Its close coastline provides easy access to overland routes that are used extensively by these armed groups. The area could likewise be attractive to terrorists seeking to gain access to the United States, serving as a forward operating base.




Tri-border Area. At least two Middle Eastern terrorist groups — Hamas and Hezbollah — are present in the tri-border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. The rough terrain, lack of government presence, and access to Arab communities in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil provide these two organizations with the opportunity to conduct illicit fundraising and money laundering, train Islamic extremists, and plan operations.




Central Asia. As noted earlier, Central Asia has significant territory attractive to armed groups. Today the following are present in this region: a burgeoning insurgency in Afghanistan along the Pakistan border; Kashmiri insurgents; the reduced insurgent movement in Uzbekistan; and re-grouping elements of al Qaeda. The region is also home to a number of criminal organizations.




Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia (SEA) has the largest portion of territory suitable for armed group activities. Present in this region is the al Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiya that since 9/11 has carried out several terrorist operations. These include the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing (killing 202 people) and the car-bomb attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 in which 12 civilians died. Other armed groups include separatists who are heavily involved in narcotics trafficking in Burma and southern Thailand; ethnic insurgents in Indonesia; and arms traffickers who are active throughout the territory. Another area in SEA not shown on the map that has active armed groups present is the southern Philippines.



Borneo. Further south is the lightly populated Indonesian region of Borneo and adjacent remote territory. Several armed groups are present there. It would be an ideal location for Jemaah Islamiya to use as a base and transit point to move operatives to the Philippines, Malaysia, and elsewhere in Indonesia.



Central Africa. Finally, Africa has several lawless/ungoverned areas. Among the regions with the largest concentration of such territory is Central Africa. It has several armed groups including insurgents, militias, and criminal organizations. Other parts of Africa that are havens for various armed groups not depicted on the map below are the Parrot's Beak area in the tri-border region of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia; the lawless borderland between Liberia and Ivory Coast; and Somalia.



In sum, this topographical plotting of lawless/ungoverned regions makes clear the extent to which these areas cover significant territory and can provide armed groups with extensive sanctuary not just for safe hideouts but to develop secure bases for training operatives, planning operations, and storing resources.

Recognition of the Importance of Armed Groups

Until recently, non-state armed groups were not recognized as important players in international politics. However, this is changing. Acknowledgment of armed groups as significant and dangerous actors on the world stage is growing. Increasing numbers of research projects and centers focus on them.

Several were cited above, including the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Non-State Actors Working Group (NSAWG) of the International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. These are in the forefront of identifying, categorizing, and analyzing armed groups as important actors in contemporary global politics. And they are only the beginning of what appears to be growing awareness that armed groups are no longer minor players in a world once dominated by states.

For example, the Centre of International Relations, a component of the University of British Columbia's Liu Institute for Global Issues, has recently initiated an Armed Group Project. Its directors note that "[d]espite the salience of non-state armed groups, the academic and policy-making communities have been slow to confront them as a distinct problem. Both have focused overwhelmingly on states, either as units of analysis, or as building blocks of a policy framework."⁸⁷

The Project is currently undertaking a "series of research en-

deavors designed to expand knowledge about the phenomenon of armed groups" and examine how to encourage them "to comply with human rights norms and international humanitarian law." Their research focuses on a number of themes including analysis of armed groups' strategies and instruments; assessment of their organizational structures; and determination of whether and how international norms influence armed groups. The website for the project includes research papers, bibliographies, and links to others concerned with armed groups.

Another project that identifies and catalogs armed groups is *Global Security*, which provides online reports on emerging international security challenges to its subscribers.⁸⁸ It lists armed groups according to the geographical region — Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa — in which they are based. Each is briefly described. Also compiling information on armed groups is the *Center for Defense Information* and the *International Crisis Group*. Yet, other research organizations, too numerous to cite here, focus on specific types of armed groups. These include terrorists and criminals. Finally, a number of armed groups maintain their own websites. These provide yet additional sources of information. Links for many of these websites can be found in the FAS profiles. To date, of all of these efforts, the profiles assembled in The Federation of American Scientists' (FAS) database remain the most inclusive.

Internal/Transnational Conflicts: A Continuing and Major Source of Instability

Internal conflicts, many with transnational dimensions, while somewhat fewer than in the mid-1990s, remain a dominant cause of violence and instability in many regions of the world. Numerous assessments by experts and quantitative data sets of the continuing significance of the clash of ideological, political, ethnic, and reli-

gious beliefs that pit armed groups against one another and against states all point in this direction. Two examples are illustrative.

The first of these assessments was sponsored by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) — *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts* — and published in December 2000. In undertaking this study, the NIC worked with a number of leading nongovernmental institutions and experts, including specialists from academia and the private sector. Ten major conferences were held in support of *Global Trends 2015*.⁸⁹

According to the findings, non-state armed groups and the internal/transnational conflicts they generate pose the most recurrent cause of instability around the globe, and these conflicts will grow in lethality due to the availability of more destructive weapons and other technologies. Moreover, many of these conflicts, particularly those due to communal differences, will be vicious, long lasting and difficult to terminate. This is because armed groups are not strong enough to eliminate the government and the government is just strong enough to hang on.

Global Trends 2015 underscores that weak and failing states will generate these conflicts, threatening the stability of a globalizing international system. "Internal conflicts stemming from state repression, religious and ethnic grievances, increasing migration pressures, and/or indigenous protest movements will occur most frequently in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and parts of South and Southeast Asia, Central America, and the Andean region."⁹⁰

The studies and assessments derived from the application of the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF), developed by the Social Development Department of the World Bank are a second example.

These reports mirror the conclusions found in *Global Trends 2015*. The purpose of the CAF is to enable World Bank teams to assess factors causing conflict when formulating development strategies, policies and programs. What these studies demonstrate is that violent internal conflict poses an unremitting and major challenge to development in many of the states that it classifies as "weak, very weak, and failed."

Apocalyptic Scenarios and the Intentions of Armed Groups

Finally, the growing concern that the US government has over possible future apocalyptic operations by armed groups is reflected in scenarios and simulations it has developed to practice responding to the consequences that will result if one of those operations crosses the WMD threshold. These scenarios and simulations reveal the magnitude of the damage armed groups can inflict today, and the need to prepare for how to respond to such catastrophic events. And these scenarios are not mere speculation but are reflective of the stated intentions of specific armed groups.

Perhaps the most widely publicized example of these exercises is "Dark Winter." In June 2001, with the support of the US government, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, and the Oklahoma National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism hosted a senior-level crisis game examining the national security, intergovernmental, and information challenges resulting from a biological attack on the American homeland.

Such an event could have severe consequences including massive civilian casualties, a breakdown in essential institutions, disruption of democratic processes, civil disorder, and reduced US

strategic flexibility. Dark Winter is a fictional scenario involving a covert smallpox attack on the United States and the challenges senior government officials would face responding to a rapidly escalating epidemic that would follow. Within 22 days, smallpox spreads to 26 states. A total of 16,000 smallpox cases are reported, 1,000 of which are fatal. Next, the NSC is told during the next 12 days the total number of cases will grow to 30,000. They are advised that a worst-case condition could result in 3,000,000 cases of smallpox and as many as 1,000,000 deaths.

Dark Winter is an option available to terrorists and other nonstate actors who *can* gain access to smallpox and other biological weapons. It illustrates that the threat posed by proliferation today is more diverse, dangerous, and increasingly difficult to counter using traditional nonproliferation approaches.

Other similar programs sponsored by the federal government to assess the nation's crisis and consequence management capacity under extraordinary conditions include the TOPOFF exercises, which test the readiness of senior government officials to respond to multiple terrorist WMD attacks at different geographical locations. Scenarios include chemical, radiological, and biological weapons.⁹¹ Several TOPOFF exercises have been held.

State governments are likewise funding WMD simulation and training exercises. For example, in April 2002 the state of Oklahoma sponsored "Sooner Spring," a simulation involving senior state-level political officials, first response agencies and organizations, and representatives from the state homeland security agency. The crisis sought to "validate bioterrorism response planning."⁹² In June 2003 the state of Kansas tested the viability of emergency response plans to handle a bioterrorism attack on livestock or crops in

a simulation exercise called "Silent Prairie."⁹³

It is not just the United States that is apprehensive about WMD attacks by non-state armed groups. There is also increased international concern over the issue. The BBC reports that globally, fears are high that nations with biological and chemical weapons expertise and stockpiles may pass them on to terrorists.⁹⁴ This led to the recent addition of 14 pathogens to the control list of the Australia Group, whose 33 members coordinate export control policies on items that could be used in chemical or biological weapons programs. These modifications "take into account that a terrorist doesn't need to get the worst of the worst," said a spokesperson for the Group. "All you need is something pretty bad and you can cause a lot of harm and a lot of panic. So, the expansion of the list is in response to the need to look at the terrorist angle."⁹⁵

Reasons for this heightened international concern include the danger of states that maintain weapons of mass destruction programs sharing them with armed groups they harbor and/or support.⁹⁶ As of September 2002 at least 13 countries were currently pursuing biological weapons and at least 16 states had chemical weapons programs.⁹⁷ Theft is another reason for worry. The stockpiles of the former Soviet Union, one of the largest producers of WMD, are insecure and have already suffered thefts.⁹⁸

These examples of United States and international concern over apocalyptic operations executed by armed group are not wild speculation. James K. Campbell and other terrorist specialists note that certain sub-state armed groups exhibit "ripeness" for developing and using WMD. These include ones espousing radical religious ideologies comprised of apocalyptic millenarianism, messianic redemptionism, or racist/ethnic prejudice.⁹⁹ Groups that believe their

actions are sanctioned or demanded by God are less likely to feel concern about backlash or be inhibited by mass casualties. Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and others are evidence that the planning for and/or actual use of WMD is a reality.

Aum Shinrikyo's ideology, for example, is based on a belief in apocalypse violence, as can be seen in its WMD operations. The first sarin attack occurred in June 1994 when Aum members sprayed sarin gas from a moving vehicle in a residential neighborhood of Tokyo.¹⁰⁰ Less than a year later, a second sarin attack was launched against Tokyo subway trains.¹⁰¹ Then in May 1995 five Aum members used cyanide gas in a subway. Finally, two months later they launched a fourth attack by placing chemical devices in subway and railway stations.¹⁰²

Other armed groups have made public statements regarding their intention to use WMD. This is another indicator that apocalyptic scenarios by armed groups today are possible. In 1995, Shamil Basayev, the most skilled and notorious Chechen paramilitary commander, was asked how he would set about destroying the Kremlin, which he referred to as "the seat of satanic power."¹⁰³ He replied that this would be accomplished by "sprinkling radioactive sand" in Moscow.¹⁰⁴ Basayev "rejoiced in the fact that developments in the twentieth-century warfare have hugely improved his chances of succeeding where generations of freedom-fighting ancestors failed."¹⁰⁵

On November 23, 1995 a crude bomb of radioactive waste and dynamite was left in a Moscow park by Chechan insurgents as a warning of their capacity to follow through on Basayev's boast. They did not detonate the device but alerted the media of its

location. According to Graham Allison in his new book *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*:

Chechan separatists have a long-standing interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and material to use in their campaign against Russia.... Chechan militants made off with radioactive materials from a Grozny nuclear waste plant in January 2000; stole radioactive metals — possibly including some plutonium — from the Volgodonskaya nuclear power station in the southern region of Rostov between July 2001 and July 2002; and cased the railway system and special trains designed for shipping nuclear weapons across Russia.¹⁰⁶

Likewise, in a December 1998 interview, Osama bin Laden alluded to WMD acquisition as part of his Holy War.

Q: The [United States] says you are trying to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons.

*A: Our job is to instigate and, by the grace of God, we did that, and certain people responded to this instigation.... Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.*¹⁰⁷

lims.

While bin Laden alluded to acquiring and using WMD, al Qaeda operatives were seeking to acquire them as early as 1993, according to the *9/11 Commission Report*. It explains that in that year a top bin Laden aide sought to purchase for \$1.5 million what he believed to be a cylinder containing weapons-usable uranium. "Al Qaeda purchased the cylinder, then discovered it to be bogus."¹⁰⁸

This did not deter bin Laden, according to other evidence found in the *9/11 Commission Report*. For example, a former al Qaeda member close to bin Laden, who defected from the organization in May 1996, provided details of continuing efforts to acquire WMD.¹⁰⁹

Interviews of other al Qaeda members also reveal that the organization was seeking to obtain WMD capability. An October 2003 memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith reported

[D]uring a custodial interview, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi [a senior al Qaeda operative] said he was told by an al Qaeda associate that he was asked to travel to Iraq (1998) to establish a relationship with Iraqi intelligence to obtain poisons and gases training. After the USS Cole bombing in 2000, two al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq for CBW-related [Chemical and Biological Weapons] training beginning in December 2000. Iraqi intelligence was 'encouraged' after the embassy and USS Cole bombings to provide this training.... CIA maintains that Ibn al-Shaykh's timeline is consistent with other sensitive reporting indicating that bin Laden asked Iraq in 1998 for advanced weapons, including CBW and poisons.¹¹⁰

By the time of the 9/11 attacks, Allison writes, the US intelligence community had concluded that al Qaeda had "experimented with chemical weapons (including nerve gas), biological weapons (anthrax), and nuclear/radiological dispersal devices (dirty bombs)." While none of these efforts came to fruition, they nevertheless reveal that bin Laden and his al Qaeda followers were serious about WMD.¹¹¹

Evidence of chemical labs in Afghanistan found in August 2002 by international peacekeepers further substantiates these state-ments.¹¹² They discovered 36 types of chemicals, explosive materials, fuses, laboratory equipment, and "guide books."¹¹³

In addition to al Qaeda, there have also been statements by Hamas members demonstrating its desire to acquire WMD. The International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism in Israel reports that after the January 1993 arrest of Mohammed Salah, he revealed details of his Hamas training, which included the building of explo-

sive devices, electronics, and the development of chemical weapons.¹¹⁴ George Tenet, then Director of Central Intelligence, in Congressional testimony in 2000, stated: " Hamas is...pursuing a capability to conduct attacks with toxic chemicals."¹¹⁵

Still another indicator demonstrating the feasibility of a WMD attack by a non-state armed group is the actual use of WMD by armed groups who have not taken credit for such actions. The "Terror Attack Database" of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, for example, lists seven instances of unknown armed groups using anthrax against targets in the United States, Pakistan, and Chile following the 9/11 attacks.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, it is important to note that although Aum's use of WMD marked the first time an extremist organization had attempted to employ a chemical substance in a mass terrorist attack, it was not, however, the first *use* of chemical agents by armed groups in order to instill terror, carry out blackmail, or cause large-scale economic damage to their rivals.¹¹⁷

In conclusion, the use of WMD by non-state armed groups is a reality. WMD is inexpensive and does not require extensive facilities. In addition, chemical substances have the advantage of mobility.¹¹⁸ In ideology, statements, actions, availability, insecure stockpiles, ease of delivery, and lethality, armed groups have all the ingredients needed to wage fourth generation warfare using WMD.

IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTELLIGENCE AND DEFENSE AGENCIES

The findings and conclusions presented in this monograph make clear that armed groups have strikingly changed the nature of conflict and war in today's international security environment. Developments in the 1990s, as demonstrated in these pages, enhanced

the power and capabilities of armed groups to attack the United States and other states in ways that constitute *direct* tier-one security challenges. And these attacks should be considered, when they rise to the level attained by Qaeda or by the insurgents, terrorists, and militias fighting US forces in Iraq, as forms of warfare and treated as such.

Moreover, there is little to suggest that armed groups are a temporary post-Cold War phenomenon. What the trend lines and data all illustrate is just the opposite. Armed groups will continue to pose serious and increasingly dangerous security challenges to states, including the United States, into the foreseeable future.

These developments have important implications for American intelligence and defense agencies tasked with responsibility for handling these challenges. Below are ten steps the United States should consider to deal with a 21st century international security landscape in which armed groups — insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations — will present a plethora of direct and indirect threats and opportunities.

- Senior policymakers and intelligence/defense community managers need to recognize the impact of the developments outlined in this monograph which demonstrate that in the years ahead armed groups will seek to attack the United States asymmetrically to strike at high-value targets. And these attacks can have strategic consequences similar to and even greater than 9/11. While not all armed groups can reach a level of power similar to that of al Qaeda, it is probable there are those who will see al Qaeda's conduct of warfare as a model to emulate and replicate.
- Policymakers and intelligence/defense community managers also have to come to comprehend the complex nature of the armed group phenomena, and the threats and opportunities that flow from their emergence as a tier-one security priority. In the 1990s, as

armed groups proliferated in both numbers and power, Washington was inattentive to these developments and subsequently paid a steep price. Given that certain non-state armed groups exhibit a keen interest in acquiring and using WMD, US policymakers and intelligence/defense community managers can afford no such indifference in the years ahead.

- The escalating role of armed groups in the international security environment of the 21st century should not be seen as only constituting threats to US interests and security. In certain cases armed groups may also provide opportunities that, if taken advantage of, will contribute to the attainment of US foreign policy and national security objectives.
- Such an appreciation of the evolving security setting necessitates major changes in the US intelligence and defense communities. Those institutions through the 1980s-1990s assessed armed groups as secondary — peripheral — security issues and were unwilling to appreciate their growing salience, linkages, and power. Even today, doubts remain in these agencies over whether any non-state armed group can undermine major US interests or carry out attacks that could have a strategic impact. That such attacks constitute a form of warfare likewise remains a suspect proposition.
- Consequently, the organizational cultures of the intelligence and defense agencies tasked with the analytic and operational responsibilities of dealing with armed groups require major revision. What the various investigations of 9/11 have all revealed is that the organizational cultures of those agencies — the pattern of thinking about their central tasks, activities, and operations — are not geared to deal with the emerging strategic challenges of armed groups. New organizational cultures must be established in the intelligence and defense communities that approach armed groups as a tier-one priority.
- Armed groups present complex analytic puzzles. Understanding them requires sophisticated tools for differentiating between and among armed groups, as well as for constructing systematic profiles of how they or-

ganize and function. These analytic tools should serve as the basis for all source collection that will provide the information needed to build such profiles.

- These profiles, in turn, would serve as the basis for developing intelligence and special operations options — political, informational, psychological, economic, and paramilitary — for responding to and degrading those armed groups that threaten the United States. They could also be employed to identify options for assisting those armed groups that provide the United States with potential opportunities.
- These profiles should also be adapted for use not only against armed groups already directly or indirectly attacking the United States, but for identifying ones in their nascent stages. This will allow the United States to take preventive measures, defusing a threat before an armed group reaches the stage of serious violence.
- Armed group profiles can likewise be employed to identify ways in which the United States may want to assist certain armed groups whose success will be advantageous to US foreign policy objectives.
- Finally, beyond major revisions in the culture of the intelligence and defense agencies that have responsibility for dealing with armed groups, the developments outlined in this monograph have other important implications for those agencies. These include the need for each to establish new practical requirements to create the requisite intelligence and defense doctrine, organization, training, and personnel to meet the armed groups challenge in the 21st century.

NOTES

¹ Nils Petter Gleditsch, et. al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 5 (2002): 623.

² On Hezbollah presence in the United States, see Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (New York: Free Press, 2002); and Anonymous, *Terrorist Hunter* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003).

³ For example, see National Intelligence Council (NIC), *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts* (December 2000) www.cia.gov/cia/reports/globaltrends2015/. In the Fall 2003, the NIC launched the National Intelligence Council 2020 Project, a year-long program of dialogues and conferences with experts from around the world. Initial products are posted at www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_home.html. Also see Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1999* posted at www.ndu.edu/inss/Strategic%20Assessments/sa99/sa99cont.html.

⁴ For example, see Jaquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, *Strategic Paradigms 2025: US Security Planning for a New Era*, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1999); and Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser (eds.), *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and US Strategy* (Washington, DC: RAND, April 1998).

⁵ Some examples include the following: Ted Robert Gurr, *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Los Angeles: UC Berkeley, 2000); Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, July 1999); Sudhir Kakar, *Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, February 1996); Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformations*, 9th edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Press, 2004); John Bailey and Roy Godson (eds.), *Organized Crime and Democratic Governability* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2000); Roy Godson (ed.), *Menace to Society: Political Criminal Collaboration around the World* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2003).

⁶ The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648. It aimed to end wars over religion and other internal matters by creating the nation-state system.

⁷ James Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁸ It is possible for a state to be part of this integration, at least at the economic level, without adopting the shared norms identified by Roseau. China would be a case in point. In addition to Roseau see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 5th ed. (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001); Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10.

⁹ Robert I. Rotberg, "Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?" This paper was prepared for the aforementioned National Intelligence Council's project on the shape of the world in 2020. It is posted at www.cia.gov/nic/NIC/home.html. Also see Rotberg (ed.), *Why States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

¹⁰ Project Ploughshares, *Armed Conflict Report 2003* www.ploughshares.ca.

¹¹ K. J. Holsti's, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15; Donald M. Snow, *Distant Thunder: Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World*, 2nd edition (New York: Sharpe M.E., Inc., 1997); Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts* (Boulder, CO: Lynne- Rienner, 1996); William E. Odom, *On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); *Small Wars and Insurgencies Journal Special Issue: Non-State Threats and Future Wars*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Autumn 2002); Ted R. Gurr, "Communal Conflicts and Global Security," *Current Security* (May 1995).

¹² The *The Minorities at Risk Project* website allows easy access to this dataset and also provides up to date qualitative assessments for each communal group www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.htm.

¹³ Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development & Conflict Management, 2003), 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Chester Crocker, "Engaging Failing States," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2003): 34-35; I. William Zartman, *Collapsed States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), chapters 1 and 17; Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (Free Press, 1991), chapter 7; Robert Dorff, "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge Ungovernability," *Parameters* (Spring 1996).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁸ Scott Baldauf and Owais Tohid, "A Triangle of Militants Regroups in Afghanistan," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 April 2003, 1.

¹⁹ Military operations in cities are taken seriously by many. The following are examples: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), *Urban Operations Journal* www.urbanoperations.com/; Travis M. Allen, *Protecting Our Own: Fire Support in Urban Limited Warfare* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1999). Global Security maintains an urban operations bibliography at its web site www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/mout.htm. Also see the bibliography on urban warfare and urban operations at the Naval War College web address www.nwc.navy.mil/library/3Publications/NWCLibraryPublications/LibNotes/liburbanwar.htm.

²⁰ MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, ed., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

²¹ Figures for states are based on the Correlates of War Project at the University of Michigan under the Direction of J. David Singer, in Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* 9th edition.

²² For the most current publication, see *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

²³ This rejection of terrorism as a form of warfare is made forcefully by Deputy Chief of CIA's Counterterrorism Center Paul Pillar's *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001).

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²⁶ Non-State Actors Working Group of the ICBL, "Non-State Armed Actors Region & Country Survey," (February 2000). The survey divides armed groups by country and by region. However, it does not designate each entry according to the types of groups noted above — rebel groups, irregular armed groups, insurgents, dissident armed forces, guerrillas, liberation movements, and *de facto* territorial governing bodies www.icbl.org/wg/nsa/library/nsasurvey.html.

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www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/report_may2000_2-e.php.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ The Para-State data is contained within the Federation of American Scientists, *Intelligence Resource Program* www.fas.org/irp/world/para/.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990), 13.

³³ Thomas H. Green, *Comparative Revolutionary Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990); Jack A. Goldstone, Tedd Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (eds.), *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Anthony James Joes, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996); Mustafa Rejai, *The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy* (New York: McKay, 1977); Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Cultural Study* (Boston: Little Brown, 1976); James DeFronzo, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Paul Ber- man, *Revolutionary Organizations* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974).

³⁴ Daniel Byman, et. al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

³⁵ Confidential interviews with Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency officials conducted in 2004.

³⁶ See Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (eds.), *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment* (Guilford, CT: McGraw Hill, 2004); Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and*

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³⁷ The database can be found at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrew's University (UK) www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/research/cstpv/.

³⁸ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) and Douglas Farah, *Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror* (New York: Broadway Books, 2004).

³⁹ Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1999) and Alice Hills, "Warlords, Militia and Conflict in Contemporary Africa: A Re-examination of Terms," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (Spring 1997).

⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch, "Cote d'Ivoire: Militias Commit Abuses with Impunity," *Human Rights News* (November 27, 2003) www.hrw.org/press/2003/11/cote112703.htm.

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⁴² Scott Patterson, *Me Against My Brother* (London: Routledge, 2000), 51, 61.

⁴³ Roy Godson and William J. Olson, *International Organized Crime: Emerging Threat to US Security* (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1993), 4. Also see Bailey and Godson (eds.), *Organized Crime and Democratic Governability*; Godson (ed.), *Menace to Society: Political Criminal Collaboration around the World*; Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1995): 57-72; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized_crime.html; Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption www.yorku.ca/nathanson/Links/links.htm; Center For Strategic and International Studies Organized Crime Project www.csis.org/tnt/;

Jane 's Intelligence Review jir.janes.com/; *The Narco News Bulletin* www.narconews.com.

⁴⁴ Godson and Olson, *International Organized Crime: Emerging Threat to US Security*, 4, 6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 6.

⁴⁶ Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizballah in Lebanon* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

⁴⁷ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*.

⁴⁸ Alberto Garrido, *Guerrilla y el Plan Colombia: hablan las FARC y el ELN* (Caracas, Venezuela: Producciones Karol, 2001); Thomas Marks, *Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002); Bailey and Godson, *Organized Crime and Democratic Governability* ; Godson, *Menace to Society*.

⁴⁹ See UN Report on the *Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo* www.un.org.

⁵⁰ Godson, *Menace to Society*.

⁵¹ For a discussion of Bout's extensive operations see UN reports by the Panel of Experts for Liberia for Dec. 20, 2000; Oct. 26, 2001; Oct. 16, 2002 www.un.org; and the *Making a Killing: The Business of War*, The International Consortium of Journalists, Public Integrity Books, Washington, D.C., 2003.

⁵² John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

⁵³ Rosenau writes that "[w]hat distinguishes globalizing processes is that they are not hindered or prevented by territorial or jurisdictional barriers. They can spread readily across national boundaries and are capable of reaching into any community anywhere in the world." Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier*, 80.

⁵⁴ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, 272; Kakar, *Colors of Violence*; Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*.

⁵⁵ Harles Heckscher and Anne Donnelon, eds., *The Post-Bureaucratic Organization* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).

⁵⁶ Peter F. Drucker, "The Coming of the New Organization," *Harvard Business Review on Knowledge Management* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1998), 3.

⁵⁷ *International Criminal Threat Assessment* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2000), 1. The interagency working group included representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; US Customs Service; US Secret Service; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; National Drug Intelligence Center; the Departments of State, the Treasury, Justice, and Transportation; the Office of National Drug Control Policy; and the National Security Council participated in the drafting of this assessment.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Foreign Policy Association, "In Focus — Al Qaeda." www.fpa.org/newsletter_info2478/newsletter_info.htm. See also Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: The Free Press 2001), 222.

⁶³ Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*.

⁶⁴ Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Andreas Vogt, "The Real Intelligence Failure of 9/11 and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First," in Howard and Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*.

⁶⁵ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Gray, *A Second Nuclear Age* (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Reinner, 1999); Gray, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History* (London: Frank Cass, 2002); Gray, "Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?" *Parameters* Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (Spring 1999).

⁶⁶ *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001* (December 2002) www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html; Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda*; Shultz and Vogt, "The Real Intelligence failure of 9/11 and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First."

⁶⁷ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars*; Peters, *Fighting for the Future*; and Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

⁶⁸ These specialists sought to determine how non-state actors could take advantage of globalization, network-based organization and information age technologies to enhance their ability to attack the state. How could these developments affect the terrorist's capacity to execute stra-

tegic level unconventional attacks on the states they targeted? By the end of the 1990s the proponents of fourth generation warfare had identified seven integrated precepts that they believed armed groups could adopt and employ with strategic effect on the state. The proponents of this theory asserted that armed groups that acquired the capacity to operationalize these seven principles in an integrated manner could attain the power necessary to initiate strategic level strikes on the state.

⁶⁹ Al Qaeda's initial financial base came from donations from 20 wealthy Gulf-state donors. The "Golden Chain" list of supporters was found during a March 2002 raid in Bosnia on an office of the Benevolence International Foundation. Benevolence was one of several US- based charities funneling money to al Qaeda and shut down by the US Treasury Department after 9/11. A 1996 CIA report estimated that one-third of the 50 Islamic NGOs "support terrorist groups or employ individuals suspected of terrorist connections." Because most of the early leaders of al Qaeda had strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood's financial empire also served to funnel money to the terrorist enterprise. Among the Brotherhood banks that have been closed because of their support for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are Bank al Taqwa and Akida Bank, both based in Nassau, Bahamas. The banks were controlled by Yousef Nada and Idriss Nasreddin, both senior leaders of the Brotherhood, and both designated as terrorist financiers by the United States and the United Nations. The UN also ordered the freezing of the assets of the joint business empire run by the two men. For descriptions of the al Qaeda financial structure, see Farah, *Blood from Stones*; Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (New York: Free Press, 2002); Anonymous, *Terrorist Hunter*; *United Nations Report of the Monitoring Group to the Security Council* (Nov. 3, 2003), available at www.un.org.

⁷⁰ See Shultz and Vogt, "The Real Intelligence failure of 9/11 and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First."

⁷¹ Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001). During the latter 1990s Pillar served as the Deputy director of CIA's Counterterrorism Center.

⁷² "The Economic Effects of September 11th," *Chicago Tribune*, 5 September 2002. This PowerPoint study was completed under the auspices of the Department of Economics at Penn State University.

⁷³ *Ibid.*; William F. Ford, "Economic Impacts of the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks (Forum on Emerging Issues)," *Business Economics* (October 2001); "Revised Forecasts," *AFSA Spotlight on Financial Services* www.spotlightonfinance.org; "Economic Forecasters See Modest, Steady Recovery," *AFSA Spotlight on Financial Ser-*

vices (October 2002). www.spotlightonfinance.org/issues/OctoberQ2/Stories/storvLhtm.

⁷⁴ Figures come from *Visibillity* — the leading litigation management solution provider to the insurance industry.

⁷⁵ "Economic Impact of 9/11 on the Airline Industry." See PowerPoint presentation at http://acy.tc.faa.gov/jup/jupq_011002/special_guest/wangerman/presentation.pdf

⁷⁶ See the Department of Homeland Security www.dhs.gov.

⁷⁷ Robert Baer, *See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002).

⁷⁸ Godson, *Menace to Society*.

⁷⁹ Douglas Farah, "Conflict Diamonds and Failed States," *Journal of International Security Affairs* (Winter 2004).

⁸⁰ United Nations Secretary General, "The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security," *Report of the Secretary General to the UN Security Council A/57/850-S/2003/754* (23 July 2003) www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep03.html.

⁸¹ "The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security," *Report of the Secretary-General*. www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/1b1f74fd1dc62a1c85256d74005b0563?OpenDocument.

⁸² Godson, *Menace to Society*.

⁸³ Measurements for each governance indicator are based on 25 separate data sources compiled by 18 different organizations, including *Afrobarometer*, Columbia University, DRI/McGraw-Hill, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Gallup International, IMD, *Latinobarometro*, Reporters Without Borders, the World Economic Forum, and the World Bank itself.

⁸⁴ *Voice and Accountability* measures the political process to determine the extent to which citizens participate in the selection of governments. *Political Stability and Absence of Violence* measures the likelihood of destabilization including domestic violence and terrorism. *Government Effectiveness* reflects quality of public service, bureaucracy, and civil servants; independence of the civil service from politics; and the credibility of the government policies. *Regulatory Quality* focuses on the policies themselves, measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision. *Rule of Law* measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include the incidence of crime, the effec-

tiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. *Control of Corruption* measures the exercise of public power for private gain.

⁸⁵ The database covers four time periods — 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002.

⁸⁶ For detailed analysis of the data and its implications see the World Bank study: D. Kauffmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002* (May 2003). www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/wp-governance.html.

⁸⁷ Please see the *Armed Groups* home page at www.armedgroups.org/home.htm.

⁸⁸ See the *Global Security* website at www.globalsecurity.org.

⁸⁹ For a listing of all those involved and the topics of the conferences held in support of the study see www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/2015_files/2015.htm.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Thomas Inglesby, Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole, "A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF," *Biodefense Quarterly* (September 2000) www.hopkins-biodefense.org.

⁹² For background see www.mipt.org/pdf/soonerspringfinalreport.pdf.

⁹³ For background on the exercise see www.mediarelations.ksu.edu/WEB/News/NewsReleases/preparedness60503.html.

⁹⁴ Please see the BBC news website: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/2808901.stm>.

⁹⁵ Seth Brugger, "Australia Group Concludes New Chem-Bio Control Measures," *Arms Control Today* (July/August 2002). www.armscontrol.org.

⁹⁶ Another example is Libya, which produced over 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents at a facility in Rabta between 1998 and 1990. Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (June 2002): 308. In addition, Iraq stockpiles are known as they used chemical weapons extensively in the closing stages of the 1980-88 war with Iran and against Kurds in northern Iraq. Furthermore, it has also admitted manufacturing mustard gas, and the nerve agents VX, sarin, and tabun, as well as the biological agent anthrax and the toxins botulinum, ricin, and aflatoxin. For more information, please see John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, *Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on*

the Middle East and Central Asia, (16 September 2003).
<http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2003/Sep/16-408986.html>.

⁹⁷ "Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation at a Glance," (September 2002) www.armscontrol.org.

⁹⁸ "In October 2001, the commander of the force that guards Russia's nuclear weapons reported that during that year, terrorist groups had twice carried out reconnaissance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites — whose very locations are a state secret." Furthermore, it has been reported that the 40 armed Chechens who seized hundreds of hostages at a Moscow theater in October 2002 had considered seizing a nuclear reactor with hundreds of kilograms of HEU. This is enough to build several nuclear weapons. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, *Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia*.

⁹⁹ James K. Campbell, "Excerpts from Research Study 'Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors,'" *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Summer 1997).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Victoria Clark, "Chechens Prefer Total War to Bad Peace," *The Observer*. 13 August 1995.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Simon Saradzhyan, "Russia: Grasping Reality of Nuclear Terror," BCSIA Discussion paper 2002-2003, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 2003 (bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=ISP&ctype=paper&item_id=374) in Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 33.

¹⁰⁷ Interview of Osama Bin Laden by John Miller, *Frontline*. PBS (23 December 1998). www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html.

¹⁰⁸ 9/11 Commission, *9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2004), 60.

¹⁰⁹ See 18 March 1997 US intelligence reports on bin Laden 's efforts to acquire WMD materials as cited in the *9/11 Commission Report*, 479, footnote 3.

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¹¹² "Kabul Terror Lab Said Found at Ex-Saudi NGO Office," *Reuters* (25 August 2002). www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/globdem/credib/2002/0825kabul.htm.

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¹¹⁴ "Parents of Slain American Teen File Suit Against Hamas Front Groups" *International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, (15 May 2000) www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=431.

¹¹⁵ Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security," *Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 3 February 2000.

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¹¹⁷ Boaz Ganor, Non-Conventional Terrorism: Chemical, Nuclear, Biological," (25 April 1998) in *2000 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Materials*. <http://cns.miiis.edu/pubs/reports/cbrn2k.htm>.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*